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Remedies and Damages for Violation
of Constitutional Rights
Frank M. McClellan*
Phoebe Haddon Northcross**
[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as
to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general
right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done.'

Since Monroe v. Pape,2 a multitude of persons claiming injury as a
result of conduct on the part of state and local officials have sought
vindication of the harm by invoking section 1983 in federal court.' The
*Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. B.A., 1967, Rutgers University; J.D., 1970, Duquesne University; LL.M., 1974, Yale University.
**Associate, Wilmer & Pickering, Washington, D.C. B.A., 1972, Smith College; J.D.,
1977, Duquesne University.
The authors wish to express their appreciation to Professor Kenneth L. Hirsch of Duquesne University School of Law and Professor Sheldon H. Nahmod of Chicago-Kent College of Law for reading and criticizing earlier versions of this article.
1. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
2. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Through its construction of the cause of action created by the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1,17 Stat. 13 (1873), the Supreme Court in Monroe
transferred to the civil context the broad reading of "under color of' state law language
established in the criminal law under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976) by United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941), and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), rendering state officers culpable for unauthorized and unlawful conduct so long as their acts were committed
under pretense of law or authority.
Several other cases, decidedin Monroe's wake, contributed to the expansive reading
of the civil rights statute. In McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), the Court, in
determining that federal relief under § 1983 could not be defeated because the plaintiff
had not first sought relief through a remedy provided by state law, reaffirmed the view
expressed in Monroe that the "federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and
the latter need-not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Id at
671 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)). See also Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam) (error to dismiss
complaint for failure to exhaust adequate administrative remedies). But see discussion at
notes 156-158 and accompanying text infra.
3. One of several Reconstruction civil rights acts, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch.
22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1873), included a provision creating a cause of action for claims of
deprivation "under color of' state law of federally secured rights. Currently codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), that provision reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
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suits have named as defendants the highest and lowest officials, including governors, 4 mayors,5 directors of the National Guard,6 police superintendents and officers,7 prison administrators, guards, and parole
board members,8 school board members and superintendents,9 mental
hospital officials and doctors," zoning board members, and licensing
officials," and prosecutors and judges. 2 Compensation has been sought
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
4. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974);
Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
5. E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational
Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F. Supp.
1397 (D. Colo.), affd, 399 U.S. 901 (1970).
6. E.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); DiLuigi v. Kafkalas, 584 F.2d 22 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979).
7. E.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977);
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608
F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1979); Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1979).
8. E.g., Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236
(1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d
1077 (3d Cir. 1976); Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
964 (1975); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 385 (1972).
9. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 613 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1979); Hoots v. Pennsylvania,
587 F.2d 1340 (3d Cir. 1978); Ball v. Board of Trustees, 584 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); Huntley v. Community School Bd., 543 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977); Roane v. Callisburg Independent School Dist., 511 F.2d
633 (5th Cir. 1975).
10. E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Reese v. Nelson, 598 F.2d 822
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 463 (1979); Beaumont v. Morgan, 427 F.2d 667 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
affd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Bartley v.
Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
11. E.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978);
Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975); United Farmworkers v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974).
12. E.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
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for widely varying injuries, including illegal search and seizure, 3 bodily
injury," loss of or diminution in value of real 5 and personal property,"
loss of government employment and other benefits, 7 damage to reputation, 8 and mental suffering and disappointment. 9
In Monroe, the court ruled that liability under section 1983 could be
imposed even though the conduct complained of also violated state
laws, and even though the officials named did not act with specific intent to deprive the plaintiffs of their civil rights. Some commentators
have expressed the fear that this broad holding unduly expanded the
right of action beyond what was contemplated by the framers of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871." 0 Others, however, hailed the new vitality
(1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir.
1977). See also Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 460
F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1972) (judicial clerks).
13. E.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Stadium Films, Inc. v.
Baillargeon, 542 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1976); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975);
Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1973); Lewis v. Kugler, 466 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir.
1971); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (en bane). See also Gillard v.
Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (school board member's search of guidance counselor's
office).
14. E.g., Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1979); Taken Alive v. Litzau, 551
F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1977); Hamilton v. Chaffin, 506 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); Howell v. Cataldi, 464
F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972); MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 852 (1970); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
15. E.g., Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1971); Adams v. City of Colorado
Springs, 308 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.), affd, 399 U.S. 901 (1970).
16. E.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Alexanian v.
New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 554 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1977); Flood v. Margis, 461 F.2d
253 (7th Cir. 1972).
17. E.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Codd v. Velger,
429 U.S. 624 (1977); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal,
586 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
18. E.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
19. E.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979); Davis v. Village Park II
Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1978); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194
(8th Cir. 1974); Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974); Basista v.
Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd,
446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972). See Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 260-62 (1978), for a full discussion of recovery of damages for mental suffering
because of procedural due process deprivations.
20. See, e.g., Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the FrontiersBeyond,
60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Shapo]; Note, Limiting the Section 1983
Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486 (1969); Note, Civil Rights
and State Authority: Toward the Production of a Just Equilibrium, 1966 Wisc. L. REV.
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given section 1 of the Act as returning to the federal courts the appropriate task of protecting constitutionally guaranteed civil rights
against invasion by the states.21
In view of the flood of section 1983 claims and the burgeoning caseload in the federal courts since Monroe, it is, perhaps, not surprising
that recently the Supreme Court has undertaken a reconsideration of
the basic nature and scope of section 1983. A principal result of
Supreme Court deliberations on the scope of section 1983 relief has
been a significant restriction of the once seemingly boundless breadth
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.22 Notably, recent decisions of the Court
have narrowly construed both the substantive rights protected through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment23 and the remedial
goals of section 1983.24 More specifically, the Court has held that reputation, standing alone, is not an interest procedurally protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, mere
damage to reputation by a state official will not provide the basis for a
cognizable claim under section 1983.25 In so ruling, the Court has emphasized that not all wrongs committed by state officials amount to
constitutional torts.26 The range of fundamental rights thought by some
to be derived from the privacy penumbra27 or concept of ordered liber831. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Note,
Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201 (1968).
21. See, e.g., Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction:A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Chevigny].
22. See discussion at notes 82-156 and accompanying text infra.
23. See discussion at notes 82-137 and accompanying text infra.
24. See discussion at notes 266-281 and accompanying text infra. But see Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and Owen v. City of Independence, 100
S. Ct. 1398 (1980), for cases extending liability for constitutional violations to
municipalities, and refusing to confer the defense of good faith, discussed at notes 252-265
and accompanying text infra.
25. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), discussed at notes 82-106 and accompanying
text infra.
26. 424 U.S. at 698-701.
27. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). But cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 598-600 & nn.23-26 (1977), analyzing the elusive concept of a protected zone of privacy
in terms of at least two different kinds of interests: (1) an individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters; and (2) an interest in independently making certain kinds
of important decisions. This analysis seems to go beyond the view expressed in Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), that the privacy rights are confined to the marital relation,
family relationship, child-rearing, and education. See also Medina v. Rudman, 545 F.2d 244
(1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977) (beyond marriage, procreation, family relationship, child-raising, or, perhaps right to engage in common occupation of life, liberty
composed of state-created interests). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 886-990 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
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ty 28-beyond those already recognized" or supported by a specific
guarantee in the Bill of Rights 3 '- has not been embraced by the Court.
The Court has also concluded that the availability of state remedies
theoretically adequate to redress infringement of interests concededly
within the ambit of liberty protected by the Constitution can negate
federal claims even where particularly abusive state conduct is
shown.' In addition, even though a viable liberty or property interest
is impinged because of procedural infirmities, absent some proof of actual injury, no more than nominal damages may be recovered.32 Moreover, the Court has significantly expanded the availability of a qualified immunity to state and local officials.' Executive officials at all
levels of discretion are permitted to assert a defense of good faith at
the time of the alleged unconstitutional act against a claim of deprivation of allegedly cognizable rights under the fourteenth amendment.'
Much of the prolific literature discussing these developments in the
last five years has been concerned with the demise of the Supreme
28. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), quoted in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973).
29. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father's
custody of children); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (private possession of obscene
materials); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (racial intermarriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (access to courts); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (association); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(sterilization of repeated larcenists); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1920) (childrearing: right to send children to and support private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (child-rearing: permit study of German in private school).
30. For a partial list of those rights specifically guaranteed against encroachment by
the Bill of. Rights and extended to states through the fourteenth amendment, see note 40
infra.
31. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), discussed at notes 140-152 and accompanying text infra.
32. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), discussed at notes 266-281 and accompanying
text infra.
33. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), discussed at notes 181-251 and accompanying text infra. In the same vein, but beyond the scope of this article, the Supreme Court
has held that a superior official cannot be compelled through a § 1983 action to take corrective action against unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates unless it can be shown
that the superior or some policymaking officer sanctioned the conduct. Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362 (1976). And state statutory law limiting or even extinguishing a right of action at
common law which most nearly corresponds to a § 1983 claim will now, under some circumstances, preclude a civil rights action in federal court unless such a law would have a
substantial effect on the viability of the § 1983 actions in the State. Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
34. See discussion at notes 230-252 and accompanying text infra.
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Court's "unabashed love affair with the Civil Rights Act of 1871."Il
Commentators, both critical and supportive of the Court's new direction, have viewed it as reflecting a concern for the increased caseload,"6
an unwillingness to make the civil rights statute a font of tort law and
disenchantment with the perceived trivialization of the constitutional
tort, 7 and a shifting view of the relationship between state and federal
relations." Although most commentators would agree that section 1983
was not intended to be a vehicle for asserting in federal court any and
all common-law tort claims against state and local officials, some fear
that the new direction taken in distinguishing constitutional from
common-law torts will completely eviscerate the significance and purpose behind the civil rights statute.39
35. Aldisert, JudicialExpansion of FederalJurisdiction"A FederalJudge's Thoughts
on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 557, 563.
36. For statistics demonstrating this indisputable rise, see, e.g., McCormick, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on JudicialEnforcement of ConstitutionalProtections,
(pt. 1), 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1974); Comment, Section 1983 and the New Supreme Court:
Cutting the Civil Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 49, 49 n.7 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Section 1983 and the New Supreme Court]; Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration after Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966, 974 n.56
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts]; Developments in
the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1136, 1172 n.224 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Section 1983 and Federalism].
37. Indeed this view has been expressed candidly by the Court in several of its recent civil rights cases, see, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976), and reflects some discomfort with the ill-defined parameters of
the constitutional tort.
38. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 27, at 309; Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note
36, at 1174-90. This shifting view is said to reflect concern for the rights of states in a
federal system as reflected in cases such as National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
362 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974), and is said to be supported by the nation's heightened interest in local
autonomy and rejection of centralized power. TRIBE, supra note 27, at 309. See also Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 36, at 1135. Indeed, it has been suggested that the
most important theme of the Burger Court has been the protection of state interests and
renewed deference to the state courts, since "[oin both procedural and substantive fronts
the Court has cut back access to federal courts and reinvigorated the concept of states'
rights." Glennon, ConstitutionalLiberty and Property: Federal Common Law and Section
1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 355, 355 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Glennon]. See also Section
1983 and the New Supreme Court, note 36 supra.
39. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 341-42 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Glennon, note 38 supra. See also Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution. Confusion Amid Conflicting Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REV. 43 (1976); The Supreme Court,
1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 92-104 (1976). One senator, fearful of the direction taken
by the Supreme Court in the last decade, has proposed legislation that could reassert the
prominent role of federal courts in the context of civil rights claims. See Civil Rights Improvement Act of 1977, S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., discussed at 123 Cong. Rec. 30 (1977)
(remarks of Sen. Mathias).
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Clearly, there must be some limitation on the availability of relief
under section 1983. Yet neither the Supreme Court, nor lower federal
courts and commentators can agree on how far the Act's remedial purposes are to intrude on overlapping areas of state concern. While intellectual debate continues as to whether recent decisions have significantly diminished the efficacy of the civil rights law, lower courts and
practitioners confronted with alleged civil rights violations need guidance in determining whether vindication of specific claims is appropriate under the Act in light of the Supreme Court decisions limiting
the cause of action itself and the ability to recover damages under section 1983.
This article, therefore, focuses on the important areas of protectable
liberty interests, the qualified immunity from damages, and appropriate remedies-themes that have been the subject of Supreme Court
discussion throughout the last decade. We will identify problems in
analysis of recent principal cases and attempt to provide direction for
reading those cases in a manner that will accommodate both the
Court's concerns in limiting the breadth of the civil rights claim and
the interests of plaintiffs who seek an effective federal remedy. In presenting our views we propose a model for determining the existence of
a constitutional right where no specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights
supports a civil rights claim. We then discuss whether proof of intentional or reckless conduct is essential to a prima facie section 1983
claim and conclude that such proof is necessary only where the constitutional right is not secured by a specific guarantee of the Bill of
Rights. Where the constitutional right is supported by a specific
guarantee of the Bill of Rights, our analysis of principal Supreme
Court decisions suggests that a prima facie case can be established
without proof of intent or recklessness. When a claim falls into this latter category, the state of mind of the actor and the reasonableness of
his conduct are factors bearing on the good faith defense and the
defendant, therefore, bears the burden of pleading and proving such
matters to escape liability for damages.
I.

PROTECTABLE LIBERTY INTERESTS

Monroe v. Pape revitalized the federal civil rights claim. Its potential breadth, however, must be viewed against the background of the
gradual incorporation of many of the Bill of Rights guarantees 0 and
40. A majority of the Supreme Court has never embraced the concept that the fourteenth amendment guarantees that "no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges
and protections of the Bill of Rights," Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting), but in defining the content of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court has looked to the Bill of Rights for guidance on the basis
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the recognition of a variety of personal and property interests protected under the modern rubric of due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment which the Civil Rights Act of
1871 was enacted to enforce." In the decade following Monroe, the
Court, through the fourteenth amendment clauses, imposed national
standards in areas traditionally associated with state and local control.
In addition to law enforcement, to which Monroe itself was addressed,
that "some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against national action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would
be a denial of due process," Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908); or because "the
specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against
the states," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Although its specific holding
was overruled in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), Palko's broader significance
was reaffirmed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments have been selectively incorporated in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, including:
1st amendment speech: Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927);
1st amendment press: Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
1st amendment assembly: DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937);
1st amendment right to petition; Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
1st amendment free exercise: Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
1st amendment establishment prohibition: Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947);
4th amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure: Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949);
4th amendment exclusionary rule: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
5th amendment right to be free of self-incrimination compulsion: Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
5th amendment protection against double jeopardy: Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969);
5th amendment right to just compensation: Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897);
6th amendment right to counsel: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
6th amendment right to speedy trial: Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967);
6th amendment public trial right: In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948);
6th amendment right to confrontation of opposing witnesses: Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965);
6th amendment right to compulsory process: Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967);
8th amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment: Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
See generally TRIBE, supra note 27, at 567-69. A similar list is set out in S. NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 37-38 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS &
CIVIL LIBERTIES].

41. Section 1983 and Federalism,supra note 36, at 1171. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty"
and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Monaghan].
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public education, 2 marital and family matters,"3 zoning," welfare,' 5
49
48
47
parole,'" prison administration, government employment, and voting
were areas implicated by the availability of the civil rights claim.
Through the utilization of section 1983, a federal forum became available to plaintiffs for obtaining monetary and equitable relief if official
action violated personal and property rights under the contemporary
constitutional theory imposing federal norms of procedural fairness
and equal treatment in the implementation of state action. This
development afforded "a potential for federal judicial involvement in
state and local affairs to an extent unknown in 1871. ''5' As the national
interest in civil rights enforcement increased, the use of the section
1983 action as a sword51 to obtain federal jurisdiction in matters involving state official misconduct, but resembling behavior previously actionable through tort law in state court, brought forth renewed concern
42. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Roane v. Callisburg Independent School Dist., 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1975); Canton v. Spokane School Dist., 498
F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1974); Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
43. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); United Farmworkers
v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503
F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974). Courts generally held, however, that inquiries into the appropriateness of zoning decisions belong in state, not federal, court. See also O'Grady v. City of
Montpelier, 573 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1978) (where state remedy exists and has not been
sought, there is no constitutional deprivation in "taking" under local zoning law).
45. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Cf. United States Dep't of Agriculture
v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
46. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642 (9th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 990 (1969) (pre-Wood v. Strickland approach conferring
absolute quasi-judicial immunity to parole board members).
47. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S.
236 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
48. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free
Library, 545 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978); Mims v. Wilson,
514 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Albermarle City Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 1242 (4th
Cir. 1974); Garcia v. Daniel, 490 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1973).
49. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964).
50. Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 36, at 1247.
51. See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 1532, 1533 (1972); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability,
50 IND. L.J. 5, 5, 11 n.31 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Nahmod].
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about the tension between the position of state courts as the primary
arbiters of basic standards of duty and conduct 2 and that of federal
courts as the protectors of individual rights.53 By the latter half of the
1970's, the view that federal intrusion in state affairs should be limited
had begun to reemerge;' through language emphasizing the availability of state causes of action to vindicate personal liberty interests
threatened by challenged state action, the Court in a number of significant cases55 denied the existence of a federal claim for relief.
A. The Progeny of Roth
In Board of Regents v. Roth," Justice Stewart, speaking for the
majority, noted that only the deprivation of the interests encompassed
by the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property
demanded procedural due process protection, and consequently, a hearing of some sort. Justice Stewart cautioned, moreover, that "the
range of interests protected by procedural due process is not
infinite."57 Attempting to give the words "liberty" and "property" in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment meaning, Justice
Stewart observed that within certain boundaries, the Court had in the
past "eschewed rigid or formalistic limitations on the protection of procedural due process."58 Without tarrying long to fully develop the content of the "majestic terms,"5 liberty and property, however, the
52. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
697-710 (1976). Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971).
53. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 90 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as FRIENDLY]. As the Tenth Circuit noted:
Section 1983 has, at its core, a concern for fundamental fairness between a powerful
government and the individual. "[Tihere can be no doubt that § 1 of the Civil Rights
Act [the predecessor to § 1983] was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly
construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights."
Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 613 F.2d 245, 252 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978)).
54. See note 37 supra. See also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238
(1976); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). See generally Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1978).
55. See notes 82-156 and accompanying text infra. We are concerned with the effect
of Supreme Court decisions construing liberty guaranteed against state deprivation without procedural protection as fostered by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus we have focused on the Court's treatment of core common-law interests protected by due process.
56. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
57. Id. at 570.
58. Id at 572.
59. Id. at 571.
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majority in Roth ruled that, in the circumstances at hand, the state's
refusal to reemploy a nontenured teacher did not implicate the
teacher's property or liberty interests.
In Roth, the Court's analysis of property claims was built upon prior
Supreme Court rulings. These previous decisions upheld the right to
procedural protection of benefits through the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause when statutory or administrative standards provided a clear implied promise of continued receipt precluding action by
the state that would affect the benefits without a hearing."0 Noting
that the fourteenth amendment's procedural protection of property extends to interests a person "already acquired in specific benefits,"'" the
Court emphasized that more than a unilateral expectation of property
must be found to invoke the protection of the due process clause as a
means of vindicating the deprivation of rights-there must be a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property interest.62 Said the majority:
"Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits."' Since Roth's teaching appointment
contained no provision for renewal, and no rule or university policy
secured reemployment, there was no support for a claim of entitlement
to reemployment that need be accorded due process protection.
The Roth Court spoke, however, of the Constitution's "broad and
majestic terms" of liberty and property "purposely left to gather
meaning from experience " " in a changing society. In determining
whether procedural protection of a property interest is constitutionally
mandated, the Court had already moved beyond the rights-privilege
theory of protection" to a view that recognized as entitlements interests founded upon expectations forwarded by the government. There60. Id at 576-77.
61. Id. at 576.
62. Id. at 577.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 571.
65. Under the rights-privileges theory, see, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46
(D.C. Cir. 1950), affd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), the availability of
procedural protection was determined by whether a governmental benefit could be
characterized as a right or privilege. That concept had been rejected in cases preceding
Roth. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (adopting the language of Professor
Charles Reich in Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)). In its place was
established the view that constitutional protection was required where there were
created statutory or other entitlements based on mutual understandings between the
government and the individual. See TRIBE, supra note 27, at 509-10, 514-15. See also Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
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fore, a right to a hearing had been accorded where an individual's
benefits were at stake for which the state had invited dependence" or
reliance on some standard for distribution."
However narrow the Court's reading of state references which
evoke such justified expectations was later to become, 8 Roth forged a
clear path for presenting cognizable claims for relief under section
1983 where property loss is asserted. Where, however, a plaintiff's
claim of deprivation is not based upon the assertion of a property entitlement, nor upon any breach of a specific constitutional guarantee of
the Bill of Rights incorporated in the concept of liberty of the fourteenth amendment, but rather is based upon an assertion that a fundamental or core liberty interest has been implicated, the question
whether procedural protection is mandated is not as easily answerable. 9 Roth's discussion of liberty interests, other than the liberty interests incorporated from the Bill of Rights, as well as the Roth
Court's treatment of the circumstances requiring procedural protection, does not clearly mark the limits of due process protection.
Supreme Court pronouncements as to the appropriateness of section
1983 relief following Roth, moreover, have been lucid and consistent
only in terms of a reluctance to afford federal relief.
After acknowledging that "liberty" is not confined to freedom from
bodily restraint 0 and listing some of the clearly defined liberty interests "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,"" the
Roth Court stated: "[W]here a person's good name, reputation, honor,
66. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license).
67. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (distribution of welfare benefits).
68. Subsequently, in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), for example, the Court refused to look into common practices upon which expectations could be generated by the
state, relying instead only on the tenable reading by the district court of a local ordinance. See id. at 353-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 361-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69. In the context of prison discipline, the Court had noted earlier that where the
state created and conferred on prisoners a right, a liberty analysis, paralleling the judicial
evaluation used where property rights are state-created, would be appropriate. See Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). Until Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), however, no case had suggested that in the absence of a specific Bill of Rights guarantee a
protected liberty interest could only arise through the state's creation. See id at 722 n.10
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (acknowledging statutory entitlements may include "many of the core values of unqualified
liberty").
70. 408 U.S. at 572 & n.11 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
71. 408 U.S. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) ("right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience," listed as definitely within the meaning of
liberty).
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or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."7 Under
those circumstances, "due process would accord an opportunity to
refute the charge before [the appropriate government] officials."7
First, the Court in Roth found that the university had made no
charge against Roth that might seriously damage his standing and
association in the community and thus implicate a liberty interest. "It
did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example,
that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality.""4 Second, the
Roth Court determined that the university had not "imposed on him a
stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities [, such as invoking] regulations
to bar [him] from all other public employment in state universities."75
Although "[t]o be deprived not only of present government employment but of future opportunity . . . is no small injury,""6 the record in
Roth contained no support for the assumption that the effect of Roth's
termination would be to foreclose future employment prospects. The
Court thus concluded that there had been no deprivation of liberty
since nothing in the record suggested that either Roth's good name
had been impugned or future employment foreclosed.
Roth endorses the belief that an individual may acquire a property
interest in government employment if a statute or other understanding induced by the government confers such an entitlement, but an
individual does not possess any liberty to choose a specific public position which the government may offer or withdraw without explanation. 7 As applied more generally, the liberty analysis in Roth itself
does not appear to be at odds with prior decisions describing the contours of the concept of liberty and affording relief despite the availability of a state forum for redress of injury because of official action.
Yet underscoring the ever-increasing tension between viewing a constitutional deprivation "against the background of tort law""8 and
allowing civil rights claims to become a "font of tort law,"79 the Court
72. 408 U.S. at 573 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1970)).
73. But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), discussed at notes 82-106 and accompanying text infra.
74. 408 U.S. at 573.
75. Id. at 574.
76. The Court stated: "Mere proof, for example, that his record of nonretention in
one job, taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to some other employers
would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation
of 'liberty."' Id. at 574 n.13.
77. TRIBE, supra note 27, at 520.
78. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
79. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
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has since utilized language in Roth that emphasizes the limitations of
the scope of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause to deny
claims of unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. Subsequent decisions, moreover, demonstrate a reluctance to look beyond positive
state law to find additional core liberty interests protected and
remediable in a civil rights claim. These subsequent decisions appear
to adopt an analytical view heretofore reserved for property entitlement claims.81
In Paul v. Davis," the Court's already identifiable inclination toward
reducing the breadth and restricting cognizable rights under section
1983 was clearly adopted. Ruling that defamation by a government official, standing alone and apart from any other concrete governmental
action, does not state a claim for relief under section 1983, the Court
refused to find a liberty interest in reputation where there was no
demonstrable statutory entitlement or accompanying loss of a stateconferred status. 3 Despite previous decisions, including Roth,8" which
suggested that reputation would be recognized as a core liberty interest, the Court determined that no interest protected by due process
was implicated.
In Paul, area police chiefs, attempting to provide merchants with additional protection against store thefts in Louisville and Jefferson
County, Kentucky, compiled and distributed a flyer identifying subjects known to be active shoplifters. Davis, the plaintiff, who had been
charged with shoplifting after being arrested by a private security
guard, was among those whose photographs and names appeared in
the flyer-despite the fact that his innocence or guilt had not been resolved prior to the publication. Shortly after the distribution, all
charges against Davis were dismissed. His employer saw the mugshot,
80. See 408 U.S. at 572-75, where the Court defined the boundaries of the liberty protection in the context of Roth's case. Despite its reference to the "broad and majestic"
liberty terms, id. at 571, necessarily given breadth "[in a Constitution for free people," id.
at 572, Roth has been quoted more often for its caution that "the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite." Id. at 570.
81. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344
(1976). See generally TRIBE, supra note 27, at §§ 10-10 through 10-13.
82. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
83. The ruling in Paul has been criticized not only because it ignores clear precedent
raising reputation as a fundamental and thus protectable interest, but also for its narrow
and rigid view that any such fundamental liberty interest need be defined by positive
state law, id. at 708. See TRIBE, supra note 27, at 527-32; Monaghan, supra note 41, at 405,
423-29.
84. 408 U.S. at 573. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969), See also Joint AntiFacist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 213 (1951).
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however, and although Davis was not fired, he was advised not to find
himself in a similar situation again.
Davis' complaint asserted that he had been deprived of liberty protected by procedural due process of the fourth amendment and that
being called an active shoplifter would inhibit him from entering business establishments and would impair future employment opportunities.85 He sought damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
The district court granted the police officials' motion to dismiss the
complaint on the basis that Davis had failed to allege facts establishing
a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right." Reversing, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that in view of
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,87 Davis had alleged facts establishing an
unconstitutional denial of due process."
The Supreme Court recognized that the assertions of Davis' complaint "would appear to state a classical claim for defamation actionable in the courts of virtually every state, [since] [i]mputing criminal
behavior to an individual is generally considered defamatory per se,
and actionable without proof of special damages." 9 Yet the Court,
speaking through Justice Rehnquist, rejected the argument that a constitutional tort had occurred. The mere fact that the allegedly defamatory action was taken by public officials rather than private individuals, in the Court's view, did not transform mere defamation into a
deprivation of a right secured by the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause. Justice Rehnquist stated: "Respondent's construction
would seem almost necessarily to result in every legally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under 'color
of law' establishing a violation of the fourteenth amendment."9
Pointing out that Davis identified no specific constitutional guarantee safeguarding the interest allegedly invaded, the Court majority
eschewed the premise that through the due process clause, section
85. 424 U.S. at 697. Compare Roth's language stating that "[t]o be deprived not only
of present government employment but of future opportunity for it certainly is no small
injury." 408 U.S. at 574 (citations omitted). Foreclosure from government employment was
not at issue in Paul. There the claim was that the state, in distributing the flyer with his
picture included, "imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom
to take advantage of other employment opportunities." Id at 573. Accepting the assertion
in Paul's complaint that the "active shoplifter" designation on the flyer "would seriously
impair his future employment opportunities," the Court found no deprivation of a right
secured by the fourteenth amendment since any interest in such opportunities was not
recognized by statute or explicitly found in the Bill of Rights. 424 U.S. at 697-98.
86. Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180, 1181 (6th Cir. 1974).
87. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
88. 505 F.2d at 1183.
89. 424 U.S. at 697.
90. Id. at 699.
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1983 made actionable wrongs inflicted by government employees
"which had heretofore been thought to give rise only to state-law tort
claims."9 Justice Rehnquist rejected the idea that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause should "ex proprio vigore extend to
him a right to be free of injury whenever the State may be charac9
terized as the tortfeasor.""
In his view, to find a constitutional deprivation here would make the fourteenth amendment "a font of tort law
to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be adminis93
tered by the states."
A second premise assumed by Justice Rehnquist to support Davis'
claim, that official infliction of a "stigma" to one's reputation implicated a protectable liberty or property interest, was also rejected.94
Although he conceded that certain language in cases such as Constantineau,95 the case relied upon by the court of appeals, could be read to
support this premise, Justice Rehnquist took the position that only
governmental action that imposed a "stigma" accompanied by a significant alteration of a status defined by state law is cognizable under section 1983. The "'stigma' resulting from the [act's] defamatory character
[would be] an important factor in evaluating the extent of the harm
worked by that act."9 Finally, since Kentucky law did not extend to its
citizens "any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation which
has been altered"97 by the official action taken, but rather merely provided a forum for vindicating such interests through tort-law damage
actions, any injury to reputation, even if inflicted by an official, was
not a change in status which could be considered a deprivation of liberty or property subject to due process safeguards.
Leaving aside Paul's specific ruling" that reputation, standing alone,
91. Id.
92. Id. at 701. Justice Rehnquist reasoned: "We have noted the 'constitutional shoals'
that confront any attempt to derive from congressional civil rights statutes a body of
general federal tort law . . . a fortioi, the procedural guarantees of the Due Process
Clause cannot be the source for such law." Id. (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
101-02 (1971)).
93. 424 U.S. at 701.
94. Id.
95. See 400 U.S. at 437. See also Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428-30 (1969);
Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951).
96. 424 U.S. at 709.
97. Id. at 711. Under Paul's analysis, despite language in Constantineau and other
Supreme Court decisions recognizing the fundamental interest at stake, whether governmental action affecting reputation entitled plaintiff to § 1983 relief would be determined
by whether the state involved had also expressly committed the state to protection
against infringement of that interest. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
98. Although this ruling appears clear, see, e.g.,
424 U.S. at 694, 712, some commentators have strained to derive a narrower ruling of the Court, leaving open the possibility
that deprivation of reputation interests, in the absence of other accompanying governmen-
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is not a protected liberty interest, a conclusion which seems inconsistent with language in Roth, Constantineau, and other earlier opinions
of the Supreme Court and lower courts," the tortuous rationale of Paul
engenders disturbing stumbling blocks for plaintiffs seeking redress of
injury under the civil rights statute. The principal problem is delineating the kinds of situations in which arbitrary conduct by state officials, not implicating rights easily pigeonholed into one of the specifically recognized guarantees of the Bill of Rights, still affords relief.
It should here be emphasized with particular interest that Justice
Rehnquist, speaking for the majority in Paul, expressed the view that
"property" and "liberty" as comprehended by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, attain their constitutional status "by virtue
of the fact that they have been initially recognized and protected by
state law." 00 In a pregnant footnote, Justice Rehnquist implied that
besides interests recognized by the law of a particular state, only
those interests guaranteed by one of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights will be procedurally protected by the due process clause and
subject to relief under section 1983.10' This implication, read in conjunctal conduct or the conference of a recognized state status, may still be actionable under
§ 1983. See, e.g., Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v.
Davis, 30 STAN. L. REv. 191 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Lessons of Paul v. Davis]. Cf.
Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Paul "has seriously undermined
if not altogether obliterated the protection previously accorded one's general reputation
in the community irrespective of any related interest in employment"). Others, however,
have frankly expressed a belief that the Court's specific holding as to the lack of constitutional protection accorded such an interest will not last long. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note
27, at 971; Monaghan, supra note 41, at 432. See also 424 U.S. at 735 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision must surely be a short-lived aberration").
99. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 213 (1951); Stewart v. Pearce, 484
F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(dissemination of arrest records to Federal Bureau of Investigation); United States v.
Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 797-98 (5th Cir. 1975).
100. 424 U.S. at 710. See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). But see note 101
infra.
101. Justice Rehnquist stated:
There are other interests, of course, protected not by virtue of their recognition by
the law of a particular State but because they are guaranteed in one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights which has been "incorporated" into the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section 1983 makes a deprivation of such rights actionable independently of state law.
424 U.S. at 710-11 n.5. Although Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that there may be some
"substantive limitations upon state action which may be encompassed within the concept
of 'liberty,"' id, he referred only to a right of privacy-limited to "matters relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing and education"
and distinguished from those guarantees of the due process clause. See id at 712-14. It
should be noted, however, that in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), Justice Rehnquist
did recognize a limited right of federal pretrial detainees not to be punished prior to an
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tion with Paul's broad language counseling against making the fourteenth amendment's due process clause a font of tort law, moreover,
has been seen by some courts as virtually foreclosing the availability
of a section 1983 remedy where liberty interests- beyond those previously identified rights of privacy centered around the family, marriage, and procreation-are implicated."' 2
Also of far-reaching import is the fact that although the Court did
not forthrightly reject the supplementary remedy doctrine,' or the
tort standard established in Monroe,04 there are references in Paul to
the availability of a state tort remedy and concern expressed that
state-law torts not be converted into federal claims merely because
officials are involved. These references-amplified in subsequent cases
-clearly reflect discomfort with the view of section 1983 as a "fullfledged alternative to state remedies.' 0 5
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Justice Rehnquist found such
a right to be free of punishment not expressly embodied.in any provision of the Bill of

Rights, nor in any statute or regulation, but in the word "liberty," as used in the due
process clause. Id at 535-36. A majority of the Court, however, ruled that the scope of
that right did not necessitate a finding of due process violations as to certain prison practices and procedures -including body cavity searches after every visit, and a total prohibition on receipt of hard-cover books except from publishers or book clubs-aimed at
preventing the smuggling of money, drugs or weapons into the institution. Calling such
rules regulatory rather than punitive, the Court found it sufficient that they had a rational basis and were without a subjective intent to punish the detainees. Id. at 548-60.
Although he disagreed with the scope of the right as articulated by the Court majority,
Justice Stevens lauded the Court's abandonment of "its parsimonious definition of the
'liberty' protected by the majestic words of the [due process] Clause," id. at 580-81
(Stevens, J., dissenting), and its recognition of a fundamental freedom derived from and
"informed by 'history, reason, the past course of decision, and the judgment and experience of 'those whom the Constitution entrusted' with interpreting that word." Id. at 580
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
162-64 (1951)).
102. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton City Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d
1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Medina v. Rudman, 545 F.2d 244 (1st
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977); Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1976);
Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1976). Compare the range of views expressed in White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1979).
103. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), it was said:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The
federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be
first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is no
barrier to the present suit in the federal court.
Id. at 183. See also cases cited at note 2 supra.
104. "Section 1979 [now 1983] should be read against the background of tort liability
that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
105. Chevigny, supra note 21, at 1352.
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If these considerations are to influence future determinations of
whether an interest should be constitutionally protected and thus cognizable as the basis for a federal claim under section 1983, not only will
the Monroe construction of section 1983 as an independent remedy be
reversed, but in addition, the fundamental conception of due process
protection which has developed will be altered. Thus, Paul may portend a significant cutback in the fourteenth amendment analysis of
whether a claim implicates a core liberty interest protected by procedural due process.0 6
B. Stigma-Plus
Under the Paul analysis, damage to reputation caused by official
charges or other action, heretofore thought to have been within the
concept of liberty, 07 does not form the basis for federal relief, at least
in the absence of the alteration of some status or other protection
already afforded by the state. 0 Thus, the Paul Court suggested that it
is not enough that injury to reputation affect the plaintiffs chance of
employment and his other dealings in the community. In order to constitute a deprivation of rights secured by the fourteenth amendment,
defamatory conduct of officials must stigmatize in connection with a
denial of a right or a significant alteration of a status previously recognized under state law. Stated simply, to have an actionable claim, the
plaintiff must establish that the official imposed some disability other
than an infliction of a stigma or harm to plaintiffs good name, reputation, honor or integrity. There must be foreclosure of some tangible interest such as freedom to take advantage of other specific employment
opportunities.'
106. In addition, Paul has been construed by some courts as precluding a § 1983 claim
based on negligence. See, e.g., Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1978);
Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 4 n.2 (1st Cir. 1978); Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th
Cir. 1976) (en banc), modifying 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 932

(1978).
107. See cases cited at note 84 aupra.
108. See text accompanying notes 100-101 supro. See also McKnight v. Southeastern
Pa. Transp. Auth., 583 F.2d 1229 (3d Cir. 1978), recognizing that PA. CONST. art. I, § 1, provides for protection of the right of reputation and thus a federally based claim would be
consistent with that state's guarantee.
109. Particularly because this approach seems to focus on the degree of harm-as

reflected only by the tangible interest implicated-and ignores the real potential for a
sanctioning motive present where reputation alone is the target of state action, we would
argue that an additional disability such as freedom to take advantage of specific employment opportunities should be an aspect of the damages consideration rather than a determinant of whether a constitutional violation has occurred. Cf. notes 274-281 and accompanying text infra.
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The Court's creation of a "stigma-plus"" standard for imputing constitutional significance to the official's action has been criticized as
inconsistent with precedent, contrary to common-law tradition, and
permitting arbitrary and outrageous action by state officials without
adequate sanctions."' Given this standard, determining what conduct is
stigmatizing and what "plus" is necessary to transform the stigmatizing conduct from merely a defamatory act to an actionable civil rights
claim has caused some consternation among plaintiffs, as well as conflict among the lower courts." 2 In the context of nontenured public
employment, the Roth Court noted that the state, in declining to hire
Roth, made no charges that might seriously impair his standing in the
community. "It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a
charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty or immorality.""1 3 Justice Stewart said that if these kinds of charges had been
110. See Danno v. Peterson, 421 F. Supp. 950, 954 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
111. 424 U.S. at 733-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., The Lessons of Paul v.
Davis, supra note 98, at 207-09.
112. See, e.g., Ventetuolo v. Burke, 596 F.2d 476, 483-84 (1st Cir. 1979) (defamation
plus termination and then subsequent suspension with pay not sufficient); Davis v. Oregon
State Univ., 591 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1978) (fact that plaintiffs deceased husband was
unsuccessful in seeking other employment after denial of tenure based on secret file immaterial since embarrassment and protection of professional competence insufficient to
implicate liberty); Dennis v. S. & S. Consol. Rural High School Dist., 577 F.2d 338, 340-44
(5th Cir. 1978) (defamation in the course of declining to rehire a nontenured employee
satisfies "stigma-plus" test even if plaintiff did seek and find employment elsewhere);
Moore v. Otero, 557 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir. 1977) (defamation in the course of transferring
employee to another position, where not essentially a loss of status, insufficient; reassignment to patrolman's duties insufficient); Huntley v. Community School Bd., 543 F.2d 979,
984-86 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977) (impairment of likelihood of obtaining future government employment in a supervisory capacity due to charges relating to
poor performance and professional incompetence as acting principal); Cox v. Northern Va.
Transp. Comm'n, 551 F.2d 555, 558 (4th Cir. 1976) ("likely impairment" of future employment opportunities caused by official leaks to press insinuating dishonesty of discharged
employee is sufficient); Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1976) (recorded reprimand and transfer of teacher to another school not sufficient); Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d
969, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 960 (1977) (defamation in connection with
the discharge of a nontenured employee sufficient); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans
Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 365-67 (9th Cir. 1976) (damages to reputation and tangible loss in being dismissed from residency not enough since charges would not preclude plaintiff from
practicing medicine); Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1976) (damage to
reputation and removal from Board of Regents of state museum not enough). See also
Knehans v. Alexander, 566 F.2d 312, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978)
(whatever liberty interest Army officer has in his reputation is not impinged by the mere
fact of an honorable discharge and nonretention in the Army); Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562
F.2d 701, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[t]o infringe one's liberty, the effect of government action
on future employment must extend beyond a disadvantage or impediment; it must
'foreclos[e] his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.")
113. 408 U.S. at 573.
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made by the state, the disposition of Roth's section 1983 claim would
have been different.
Thus, the Court suggested that a constitutionally significant loss of
reputation clearly arises when there is loss of employment and the
stigma attaching as a result of official charges refers to immorality or
dishonesty, affecting an employee's standing in the community.
Whether charges referring to professional competency,"' intoxication,"' or other references not clearly tinged with moral turpitude,
when accompanied by loss of employment, can also be grounds for a
section 1983 action if no opportunity for a hearing is afforded is debatable."' In cases after Paul, moreover, the Supreme Court has also required that, in order to be considered stigmatizing, the official charges
or reasons for the state's conduct must be made public,"' and that such
charges must be denied by plaintiff as false." 8
Whatever the stigmatizing conduct, of great concern to plaintiffs attempting to meet the constitutional standard of Paul and its progeny is
the requirement that some deprivation of a tangible interest beyond
injury to reputation-such as loss of specific opportunity for employment- must be shown. Paul explicitly spoke of interference with other
employment opportunities when accompanied by reputational injury as
meeting the "stigma-plus" standard. Even in this situation, however, in
order to recover for the constitutionally violative conduct, plaintiff
faces the problem of summoning proof that the state conduct or
charges were known to prospective employers, causing his denial of
employment. Where evidence is available relating to the denial of the
accusations made by the state official, communication of the charges by
those responsible to other potential employers, applications submitted
114. Compare, e.g., Davis v. Oregon State Univ., 591 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1979) (embarrassment and reflection on professional competence accompanying denial of tenure not
sufficient) and Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 365-67 (9th Cir. 1976)
(stigma of moral turpitude, not professional incompetence or inability to get along with
coworkers is required; repercussions outside of professional life needed) with, e.g., Ball v.
Board of Trustees, 584 F.2d 684, 685 (5th Cir. 1978) (choosing to wear a beard rather than
be clean-shaven has no effect on a man's profession or ability to earn a livelihood and
therefore is not a stigma) and Huntley v. Community School Bd., 543 F.2d 979, 984-86 (2d
Cir. 1976) (charges relating to performance and professional competence of acting principal
and failure to demonstrate leadership sufficient).
115. See, e.g., McKnight v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 583 F.2d 1229, 1236-39 (3d
Cir. 1978) (charge of intoxication analyzed in terms of whether it attributes to employee a
status rather than focuses on a particular act); Dennis v. S. & S. Consol. Rural High
School Dist., 577 F.2d 338, 340-44 (5th Cir. 1978) (public charges that plaintiff had a drinking problem).
116. See the discussion of nuances involved in determining whether a stigma attaches
in McKnight v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 583 F.2d 1229, 1236-39 (3d Cir. 1978).
117. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
118. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
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to potential employers, reasons given for rejection, and practices
among employers toward hiring other persons with plaintiff's qualifica9
tions and similar disabilities, a right to relief would be clear." Mere
proof of nonretention of one job, on the other hand, or rejection without evidence of public dissemination of the reputation-infringing information would not generally establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunity amounting to a deprivation of liberty under Paul.2 '
The Roth Court's discussion of a stigma or other disability in the
context of foreclosing freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities and its suggestion that a person's reputation, good name,
honor or integrity affected by governmental action would invoke an opportunity to refute charges need not have been inextricably linked. 2'
Under Paul's view, however, one without the other does not rise to a
"liberty" interest procedurally protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. In the context of an allegation of a property deprivation, to be more than a unilateral expectation, a claim of
entitlement must be supported "by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits."' 22 Under Roth, and before
Paul no such state-recognized status or right had been thought to be
required in the context of a claim of deprivation of a liberty interest.'23
In creating a stigma-plus requirement for obtaining relief, Paul seems
to merge the two arguably separate interest analyses of liberty and
property deprivation into one."' The analysis approved in Paul en119. McKnight v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 583 F.2d 1229, 1238 (3d Cir. 1978).
120. But see Dennis v. S. & S. Consol. Rural High School Dist., 571 F.2d 338, 340-44
(5th Cir. 1978) (defamed nontenured employee sought and did find employment elsewhere);
Cox v, Northern Va. Transp. Comm'n, 551 F.2d 555, 558 (4th Cir. 1976) ("likely impairment" of future employment opportunities).
121. See 408 U.S. at 573-74. In Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977), Justice Stevens in
dissent pointed to two quite different interests which may be implicated when a nontenured employee is discharged: (1) an interest in good name, reputation, or integrity; and
(2) an interest in avoiding a stigma or other disability that foreclosed employment opportunities. Id. at 631 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Contrary to the analysis set out in Paul,
and carried forth in Codd and Bishop, the necessity for a due process hearing would be
compelling in both circumstances. See also id. at 629, 630-31 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971);
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
122. 408 U.S. at 577.
123. See TRIBE, supra note 27, at 522-39; Monaghan, note 41 supra. Indeed, it has been
stated: "True liberty rights do not flow from state laws, which can be repealed by action
of the legislature. Unlike property rights they have a more stable source in our notions of
intrinsic human rights." Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's
Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
124. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 710-12.
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genders the anomaly of affording relief under section 1983 where
damage to reputation is alleged only by combining the claim of a
stigma-not constitutionally cognizable standing alone-with the infringement of a state right or status itself not constitutionally cognizable as a liberty interest. Alone, neither need be able to support a
federal remedy. When combined under Paul, however, constitutional
proportion entitling procedural protection is achieved through reasoning more closely paralleling that heretofore reserved for property interests rather than a concept of liberty.
The substantive effect of this analysis takes on greater significance
when one appreciates the gradual shift away from the view espoused
in the early 1970's that procedural due process protection should extend to both the preservation of a range of fundamental liberty and
property interests independent of state laws, and to those entitlements
created by the state. 12 5 The view now acceptable is the positivist approach of determining whether procedural safeguards are constitutionally mandated based solely on whether state law invited reliance
or otherwise sanctioned an entitlement."' Read broadly, Paul suggests
that the view of a prominent role for the procedural due process doctrine in defining the government's relationship with the individual,
raised by the recognition of the inherent fundamental value of certain
interests beyond those protected by the Bill of Rights and the privacy
penumbra, may be no longer viable. The approach embraced by Paul
plays down the role of citizen participation in determining what process is due and rejects. the theory that, for preservation of human dignity, certain interests, valuable in a free society yet vulnerable to the
risk of denial by the majority, should be safeguarded by a norm of fairness." It looks rather to the procedural minimization of factual error
in the application of substantive state-created rules. 28 In itself this
seems to be a kind of trivialization of the constitutional tort.
The Court's subsequent decision in Codd v. Velger" underscores
this troublesome aspect of Paul's analysis. In Codd, the plaintiff
claimed a denial of due process in being dismissed from his nontenured
position as a city policeman, and in being rejected from other employment because of the dissemination of information in his personnel file
about a suicide attempt while he was a trainee. The Court held that
the claim was precluded by plaintiff's failure to raise the falsity of the
125. TRIBE, supra note 27, at 514-19. See eg., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
126. TRIBE, supra note 27, at 519-25. But see note 69 supra.
127. TRIBE, supra note 27, at 539.
128. See generally i& at 501-57. Compare, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)
with, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
129. 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
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suicide attempt report. The Court's conclusion that failure to allege
falsity negates a right to damage for the denial of a hearing, while consistent with Paul's view of Roth as involving "government 'defamation," 13 ignores the underlying values of a due process hearing.'3 1 By
focusing on the defamatory aspects of the official conduct, and thus requiring falsity, the Court ignores a function of the fourteenth amendment and section 1983 relief to ensure fairness of procedures: where
state procedures or excessive conduct involve sufficiently grievous consequences so as to constitute a deprivation of liberty, relief should be
available, regardless of the substantive merits of the individual case."'2
The problems inherent in the majority's approach in Codd were considered by Justice Stevens in a dissenting opinion. In discussing the
potential constitutional ramifications of a denial of public employment,
he stated that if the charge involves a deprivation of liberty, due process protection should be required, regardless of the veracity of the
charge. To Justice Stevens, the mere discharge constitutes part of the
deprivation of liberty against which the employee is entitled to defend,
and thus requires a hearing to consider whether the charge, if true,
warranted discharge. Aside from damage to reputation and employment prospects caused by release of unfavorable information, injury
130. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 708-10. Although Monroe directed the courts to
view the § 1983 constitutional claim against the background of tort law, this language was
not suggesting that a constitutional claim must meet common-law tort requirements to be
actionable. See Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1972).
Indeed, as has been recognized by one commentator, the application of tort doctrine in
a § 1983 action may lead to a result inconsistent with federal policy. See Nahmod, supra
note 51, at 5, 11 & nn. 12, 34 (damages). Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (important common-law criteria of defamation inconsistent with the first amendment interests). As was said in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01
(1978): "Section 1983 has, at its core a concern for fundamental fairness between a powerful government and the individual."
131. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972), it was observed that "the Due Process Clause . . . [was] designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones."
132. Cf. text accompanying notes 266-306 infra, discussing damages in the context of a
procedural due process claim. Before Paul, some courts had recognized the privacy implications of disclosure of even truthful information. See, e.g., Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Dooley,
364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In rejecting reputation as the basis for federal relief,
Justice Rehnquist, in Paul, noted that privacy rights were generally confined to the
marital relation, family relationship, child-rearing, and education. See also Holman v. Central Ark. Broadcasting Co., 610 F.2d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1979) (no right to privacy is invaded
when state officials allow or facilitate publication of an official act such as an arrest). But
see note 27 supra.
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could result from uncontested official
determination that the employee
33
is unfit for public employment.
Theoretically, the breadth of Paul's wholesale exclusion of reputation from the reach of procedural due process, without some tangible
interest at stake, conjures up examples of arbitrary action by state
officials "frightening for a free people."'" As was alluded to earlier,
Paul has been construed by some lower courts as foreclosing the availability of section 1983 redress for other constitutional claims based
upon arguably core interests encompassed by the fourteenth amendment's due process protection of liberty. Indeed, the Court's language
does suggest that a claim for relief not resting on some specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights incorporated into the fourteenth amendment
will not be recognized, at least where there are tort-law remedies in
existence, and perhaps even if the conduct committed by a governmen115
tal official seemingly is offensive to the "concept of ordered liberty. 1
The Court's blanket approach of removing such interests as reputation from constitutional protection for the purpose of avoiding federal
involvement in actions involving the "garden variety of torts"" is unwise and short-sighted. Where such a fundamental interest as reputation is at stake, it would seem preferable to recognize that interest as
within the concept of liberty-even if it is concluded that the case at
issue is not one appropriate for section 1983 relief.
The appropriateness of relief, on the other hand, should be for the
court to determine, based upon an assessment of whether the alleged
conduct violated federal constitutional norms.'37 Where a liberty interest is implicated by state action though not involving conduct within
the protection of one of the specific Bill of Rights safeguards, then the
allegedly violative conduct should be evaluated in terms of a national
standard of fundamental fairness. Then, even if relief is unavailable in
a particular case because the official conduct could not be said to be
outrageous, to shock the conscience, or to be otherwise offensive to the
concept of ordered liberty, the possibility for federal relief in a subsequent case involving conduct impinging upon a !similar fundamental interest and violating the norm of fairness is not precluded. The Court's
present approach has severely hampered the development of constitutional law, and has unnecessarily reduced the protection afforded citizens by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
133. 429 U.S. at 633. See also Unified School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson, 583 F.2d 1118
(10th Cir. 1978).
134. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
136. Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979).
137. See note 155 and accompanying text infra.
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The facts presented by Ingraham v. Wright1 3 8 and Baker v. McCollan,'" provided the Supreme Court with opportunities to embrace
this line of reasoning and to remove some of the unnecessary restrictions which the Paul Court had placed on a section 1983 cause of action. Indeed, some of the Justices did allude to some of the considerations and reasoning discussed above. In both cases, however, the Court
majority, pointing to the availability of state remedies, found no need
to permit federal relief or to impose federal procedural safeguards.
In Ingraham, the use of corporal punishment in public schools sanctioned by state legislation and local school board regulation was held
by the Court to be not violative of the eighth amendment. The "infliction of appreciable physical pain""' through paddling, however, did
touch upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring due
process protection. The Court noted that although there is a "de minimus level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned,""'
fourteenth amendment liberty interests are implicated whenever
school officials, acting under color of state law, deliberately decide to
punish and consequently inflict appreciable physical pain on the child.
The Court, however, in balancing considerations of deprivation of
such interest, the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards, and the state interest in order to determine
"what process is due,""' 2 concluded that state remedies were fully adequate to satisfy due process. It noted that a state statute made malicious punishment of a child a felony,"" that a common-law tort remedy
was available when a teacher inflicts excessive punishment on a
child, "' and that instances of abuse are an "aberration.""' Consequently, "[i]n the ordinary case, a disciplinary paddling neither threatens seriously to violate any substantive rights, nor condemns the child
'to suffer grievous loss of any kind.'""" In view of the common-law and
statutory restrictions coupled with state criminal and tort remedies,
the Court determined that no supplementary constitutional safeguards
were warranted.
Unlike the Paul Court, the Ingraham majority did not deny the existence of an interest that was federally protected "because of what
138. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
139. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
140. 430 U.S. at 674.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 677 & n.45. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.03(3) (West 1976).
144. 430 U.S. at 676-77 & n.45.
145. Id. at 682.
146. 430 U.S. at 678 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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the government is doing."" 7 But student victims of unjustifiable or
abusive corporal punishment can find little solace in the Court's recognition of such a liberty interest, since in the same breath of recognition, the Court constricted the right by determining that the availability
of state remedies satisfied constitutional due process requirements.
It is our belief that the theoretical availability of post-deprivation
state tort remedies should not be determinative of the coverage or of
the protection afforded by the due process clause and relief under section 1983. " 8 Justice White, in his dissenting opinion in Ingraham, appeared to agree with this proposition when he emphasized the particular inadequacy of such remedies in the corporal punishment context,
adding that since "[tihe infliction of pain is final and irreparable, it cannot be undone in a subsequent proceeding."" 9 He therefore rejected
the theory of the majority that "the State may punish an individual
without giving him an opportunity to present his side of the story, as
long as he can later recover damages from a state official if he is innocent."'5 0 Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, raised but left open the
question of whether a post-deprivation state remedy is constitutionally
sufficient where deprivation of a liberty interest is involved. 5' Clearly,
an affirmative answer effectively denies a federal forum for vindication
of rights purportedly protected by the Constitution, contrary to the
dictates of Monroe and the view that the federal courts have the primary responsibility for defining and protecting rights secured by the
Constitution.'
It eliminates a fundamental requirement of due process-to afford an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner.
In Baker v. McCollan, the Court disagreed with the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that conduct by officials which
made out the common-law elements of false imprisonment provided a
viable claim under section 1983. The plaintiff, McCollan, had been mistakenly arrested under a warrant issued for his brother, and was detained by the Sheriff of Potter County, Texas for eight days. McCollan

147. See 430 U.S. at 672-74.
148. None of the opinions in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), took the view that
the theoretical availability of state remedies should preclude § 1983 relief. If the supplementary remedy doctrine of Monroe, see note 103 supra, is rejected, quaere whether in
circumstances where a plaintiff sues in state court he can return to federal court under a
theory of inadequate remedy. Cf. note 130 supra.
149. 430 U.S. at 693-95 (White, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 695-96 (White, J., dissenting).
151. Id at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. See, e.g., FRIENDLY, note 53 supra; TRIBE supra note 27, at 535; Section 1983 and
Federalism, supra note 36, at 482. See also Becker Phosphate Corp. v. Muirhead, 581 F.2d
1187 (5th Cir. 1978).
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claimed his detention deprived him of liberty without adequate due
process. Although the Court did not dispute that the detention of
plaintiff was wrongful under tort-law analysis, it concluded that the
conduct was constitutional. "The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all deprivations of liberty. It protects only against deprivations of liberty accomplished 'without due process of law.'"'"" The
Court reasoned that plaintiff had failed to meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating that he had been deprived of a right "secured
under the Constitution.' ' 54 Since this detention was pursuant to a warrant conforming with fourth amendment standards, made applicable to
the states by incorporation under the fourteenth amendment, and since
no other specific guarantee was identified as applicable, the Court
majority concluded that a section 1983 claim had not been made.
McCollan's determination that no violation of rights secured by the
Constitution had been shown was made by the majority without evaluating the applicability of constitutional safeguards included in the definition of liberty beyond those guarantees devolved from the Bill of
Rights. Thus, although Justice Blackmun concurred, he added: "The
Court today does not consider whether petitioner's conduct 'shocks the
conscience' or is so otherwise offensive to the 'concept of ordered liberty' . . . as to warrant a finding that petitioner denied respondent due
5
process of law." 1
Although the McCollan Court did not completely ignore the fundamental liberty interest involved, its decision is consistent with Paul,
for, in McCollan as in Paul, the Court suggested that absent some
specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights being impinged, a plaintiff will
rarely succeed on a cause of action asserting a due process violation
because of a liberty deprivation. As in Paul, Codd, and Ingraham, the
Supreme Court in McCollan seemed unwilling to evaluate the fairness
and regularity of procedures where post-deprivation state tort remedies are potentially available. Yet the Court's apparent disposition not
to become involved in such an evaluation in a case like McCollan may
be even more difficult to justify since plaintiff's detention after arrest
resulted from arguably insufficient procedures used by the sheriff's
153. 443 U.S. at 145.
154. Id. at 146.
155. Id. at 147 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)). Justice Blackmun added:
I do not understand the Court's opinion to speak to the possibility that Rochin
might be applied to this type of case or otherwise to foreclose the possibility that a
prisoner in respondent's predicament might prove a due process violation by a
sheriff who deliberately and repeatedly refused to check the identity of a complaining prisoner against readily available mugshots and fingerprints.
Id at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

1980

Section 1983

437

office, and pretrial detention has been heretofore generally thought to
be a serious deprivation of individual liberty.1"
C. Paul's Progeny
Monroe's expansive reading of section 1983 as providing relief for
official conduct occurred in the context of a claimed deprivation of
rights secured by specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights incorporated
in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As plaintiffs
began to assert constitutional claims of inadequate procedures based
upon violations of rights involving core liberty interests not confined
to guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the Court, more troubled by the
overlapping of these constitutional claims and common-law tort actions,
sought some means of limiting the federal relief available.
One approach taken by the Court has been to deny a due process
claim under section 1983 where the alleged violation implicates a liberty interest not specifically protected by those guarantees of the Bill
of Rights incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. A result of this
approach is to relegate the plaintiff to a state forum for redress of injuries to fundamental personal interests caused by official conduct that
offends the concept of ordered liberty or that shocks the conscience.
Although the theoretical existence of a forum in state court to vindicate wrongs remediable under section 1983 is not, according to
Monroe, relevant to determining if the alleged violative conduct entitled plaintiff to a federal claim, the hypothetical availability of a
state-court remedy now appears to be a focal point in deciding whether
plaintiff has met the threshold requirements of establishing a constitutional violation.
In view of the Court's reliance upon the theoretical availability of a
state-court remedy as a basis for deciding whether a particular interest is constitutionally protected and whether a claim under section
1983 is available, a further question is raised whether the Court will
subscribe to its view, set forth in Monroe, that one of the basic pur156. Indeed, in Ingraham v. Wright, it was stated: "Among the historic liberties so
protected was a right to be free from and to obtain judicial relief for unjustified intrusions
on personal security." 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977). In this connection, it is significant, as was
pointed out by Justice Marshall in McCollan, that "petitioner and his deputies made absolutely no effort for eight days to determine whether they were holding an innocent man in
violation of his constitutionally protected rights." 443 U.S. at 149 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also note 101 supra. A similar interest, protected by the fourth amendment and made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, arises in the context of unwarranted intrusion by the state in the course of criminal investigations. See Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977). In Ingraham, a liberty interest was recognized as extending beyond the constitutionally protected norms embodied in the fourth amendment
unreasonable search and seizure prohibitions. See 430 U.S. at 673 n.41.
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poses of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was "to provide a federal remedy
where the state remedy; though adequate in theory, was not available
in practice."' 57 The concern for the protection of fundamental rights
underlying that view led the Court in Monroe to conclude: "The federal
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not
be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."'"
Should the Court continue to rely on the theoretical availability of
state court remedies as a basis for restricting the scope of section
1983, the Court will undoubtedly have chosen an approach that will
answer many of its concerns regarding its burgeoning caseload. Such
an approach could also provide a certain line of demarcation in the
overlapping area of constitutional and common-law tort claims. Unfortunately, those results would be achieved at the expense of a once
viable civil rights remedy.
This prospect is cause for serious concern to those who believe that
the existence of constitutional rights, as well as the existence of
remedies for redressing violation of those rights, should not depend on
the vagaries and limitations of state law. Moreover, in the Court's
retreat from a view supporting federal-law insinuation where fundamental interests are impinged because of governmental action, there is
manifested a more narrow understanding of the scope of liberty interests entitled to due process protection which negates the fundamental
values of those interests at stake and ignores the relationships of
government and citizen, and the individual's role in determining what
process is due.
Although the objectives of attaining judicial efficiency and of avoiding unnecessary overlap between federal and state relief are desirable
results, these goals should not be forwarded by sacrificing the constitutional protections afforded citizens under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The following sections of this article explore
the alternative means used by the Supreme Court to limit the potentially broad relief afforded individuals by section 1983. The basic criteria for section 1983 liability is then used to develop a model for
assessing the viability of a section 1983 claim.
II.

OF REMEDIES AND IMMUNITIES

In addition to the marked tendency to narrowly construe the rights
protected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause, the
Supreme Court in the last decade has focused on two other aspects of
the section 1983 claim as a means of limiting its reach: the defendant's
state of mind and damages relief. These issues at first glance appear to
157.
158.

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 174.
l at 183.
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be distinct from each other and unrelated to the scope of fourteenth
amendment rights. A careful examination of Supreme Court decisions,
however, reveals that these issues are closely connected and interdependent, since the existence of a right and a damage remedy under the
Supreme Court's current analytical focus will often turn on whether
the defendant knew or should have known that his conduct would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights or cause him other serious injury.
Clarification of the interrelationship of the actor's state of mind to
the determination of whether a constitutional violation has occurred,
whether a remedy lies for such a violation, and whether there exists
some kind of immunity from damages is essential to an overall assessment of the current status of law governing section 1983 claims. Once
the relationship among these issues is clarified, the Court could successfully meet its objective of "cut[ting] the civil rights act down to
size,"' 59 without continuing its course of denying the existence of fundamental interests of constitutional dimensions.
A.

Proposed Model for the Prima Facie Case
and the Good Faith Defense

An analysis of the standards enunciated by the Court in its recent
decisions, in light of the concerns discussed above, leads us to the
following suggested approach for deciding a section 1983 case. Initially,
the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving deprivation of a liberty
or property interest protected by the Constitution."e If the conduct of
the defendant is prohibited by a specific provision of the Bill of Rights
applicable to the state through the fourteenth amendment, the plaintiff
can establish a prima facie case by establishing that the defendant's
conduct violated the specific constitutional provision.' 1 On the other
hand, if the defendant's conduct is not prohibited by a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, plaintiff must establish that the conduct was
so outrageous under the circumstances that it shocks the conscience or
offends the basic concept of ordered liberty."" To prove such a case,
plaintiff will have to show that the defendant either acted with the intention of causing him serious harm, or acted in reckless disregard of
the fact that his conduct was likely to cause such harm.' 3
159. Section 1983 and the New Supreme Court supra note 36, at 1.
160. See text accompanying notes 56-106 supra.
161. See text accompanying notes 211-229 infra.
162. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 147-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also
text accompanying notes 211-229 infra. Cf. Shapo, supra note 19, at 327 (suggesting a standard of outrageous conduct for all § 1983 claims).
163. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In Estelle, the Court stated:
Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the
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Once a constitutional violation has been established, the good faith
defense must be evaluated. If the plaintiff's claim is based upon a
specific provision of the Bill of Rights, defendant can escape liability
for damages by establishing that he acted in good faith in that he did
not act with the malicious intention of depriving plaintiff of a constitutional right and that his conduct was reasonable under the circumstances."4 If plaintiffs claim is based upon conduct so outrageous that
it shocks the conscience, plaintiff's proof of this claim will effectively
refute any claim of good faith made by the defendant.165
To support the above model for analyzing and resolving section 1983
claims, it is necessary to comprehensively analyze the recent principal
Supreme Court decisions concerning the establishment of a prima facie
case and a good faith defense.
B. Standardsfor Determining the Type of Conduct
Which Subjects an Actor to Section 1983 Liability
To date, the Supreme Court has failed to determine conclusively the
relevance, if any, of a defendant's state of mind to a claim of unconstivictim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts
or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend "evolving standards of
decency" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 106 (footnote omitted). Since the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
prohibition has been held to apply only to the prison context, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651 (1977), a person who suffered harm outside of the prison context as a result of
state officials' performing functions such as health care delivery would have to rely directly on the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process to assert a valid § 1983 claim.
Success would probably depend upon proof of conduct so outrageous that it shocks the
conscience and violates basic concepts of ordered liberty. Proof of intent to harm or indifference may then be essential. See, e.g., Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 494 (7th Cir.
1979) ("recklessness is required to recover for deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment"). Consequently, the standards for
establishing certain types of violations of the eighth amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment may be equivalent to the standards for establishing a violation of a fourteenth amendment right not secured by a specific provision of the Bill of
Rights. To this extent the eighth amendment's prohibition may be characterized as a
limited exception to our position that rights secured by specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights do not depend upon the state of mind of the actor. At the same time, the Court's
ruling in Estelle may serve as a guideline for assessing § 1983 claims based on the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process where the right asserted is not secured by
a specific provision of the Bill of Rights.
164. See authorities cited at note 173 infra.
165. If defendant's conduct is so outrageous that it shocks the conscience, it would
follow that defendant could not have acted in good faith. But see Beard v. Mitchell, 604
F.2d 485, 496 (7th Cir. 1979) (asserting that an official could have a "reasonable belief'
that "grossly unreasonable" conduct is "lawful").
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tutional tortious conduct.' In Monroe v. Pape,'67 the Court held that
proof of "willfulness" on the part of the actor was not a necessary requirement for a section 1983 claim; section 1983 was to be "read
against the background of tort liability which makes a man responsible
for the natural consequences of his action."' " Since tort law under
various circumstances provides for the shifting of loss on the basis of
intentionally tortious conduct, negligent conduct, and strict liability,
the question remained after Monroe whether negligence and strict
liability were proper bases for imposing liability under section 1983.119
The lower courts have considered the question of the appropriate standard for section 1983 liability, but have not agreed on an answer. Some
courts have required proof of intentional or grossly negligent conduct, 7 ° and others have approved section 1983 actions on the basis of
ordinary negligence. 7 '
The Supreme Court has declined to resolve the conflict, electing instead to concentrate on the appropriate standards for the good faith
defense. 7 ' In so doing, the Court has rendered decisions which demonstrate both uncertainty as to the appropriate standards for immunity
from damages and inconsistency in the application of the standards to
various state officials.' These decisions are confusing when examined
166. The language of the statute does not address the state of mind issue. For a good
discussion and analysis of case law see Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 36, at
1204-09; Note, Section 1983 Liability for Negligence, 58 NEB. L. REV. 271 (1971) [hereinafter .cited as Liability for Negligence].
167. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
168. Id. at 187.
169. For an analysis of the problems posed by a literal reading of the quoted language
see Nahmod, note 51 supra. See also Liability for Negligence, note 166 supra (arguing for
an elimination of the intent-negligence standard in § 1983 cases).
170. See, e.g., Johnson v. Shaw, 609 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1980); Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1979); Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978); Bonner v.
Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); Hoit
v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 602 (1st Cir. 1974); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 284, 287 (8th
Cir. 1973) (dicta); Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1972).
171. Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1975); McCray v. Burrell, 516
F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 426 U.S. 471 (1976); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d
877, 882 (10th Cir. 1974); Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1077 n.7 (6th Cir. 1972); Wright
v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1975); Carter v.
Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
172. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 349
(1978). Some courts, however, have construed Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), as precluding a § 1983 claim based on negligence. See cases cited at note 106 supra.
173. See notes 230-251 and accompanying text infra. For further analysis and critique
of the immunity standards enunciated by the Court see Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (1977); Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REV.
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solely for the purpose of understanding the good faith defense. Analysis of the relationship of the enunciated standards for the defense to
the standards for the establishment of a prima facie section 1983 case
reveals even more complex problems.
A major problem is that the Court has referred to "good faith" ' ' as
a defense, but has never ruled that the defendant has the burden of
pleading or proving the existence of good faith. Thus, it is unclear
whether a defendant's motion to dismiss a section 1983 action should
be granted because of the absence of plaintiff's allegations or proof as
to the absence of good faith."' Bad faith could be treated as a part of
plaintiff's prima facie case, analogous to the Court's approach to actions for defamation.176 Alternatively, good faith could be treated as an
affirmative defense which the defendant has the burden of pleading
and proving.'77
If good faith is treated as an affirmative defense, the question will
remain whether a section 1983 cause of action requires plaintiff to
allege and prove a particular wrongful state of mind or some degree of
fault on the part of the defendant in order to allege and prove a prima
526 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Freed]; Kattan, Knocking on Woo& Some Thoughts on the
Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30 VAND. L. REV. 941
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Kattan]; Theis, Official Immunity and the Civil Rights Act, 38
LA. L. REV. 281 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Theis); Section 1983 and Federalism, supra
note 36, at 1190-204.
174. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978); Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 552 (1967).
175. In Procunier, the Supreme Court approved the district court's grant of a summary judgment in favor of the defendants where plaintiff alleged only negligence in one of
his counts. The Court's decision was, however, based on what it perceived to be plaintiffs
inability to refute the defendant's claim of good faith, and not on plaintiffs failure to meet
a burden of pleading and proving bad faith. 434 U.S. at 563-65. Neither of these issues was
discussed in Procunier.
It should be noted that the pleading and proof burdens may be allocated to different
parties. "Either policy or convenience, or both, may require one party to take the pleading initiative in putting an issue into the case, even though other considerations may require his adversary to prove his side of it (once the issue is injected)." F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE

105 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as

JAMES

& HAZARD].

176. To protect an individual's first amendment rights while at the same time allowing
states to protect another individual's reputation, the Court has required public officials
and public figures who bring defamation actions to plead and prove "actual malice." Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
177. Leading commentators agree that there is no universal working rule to determine
the party on whom the law will place the burden of proof for any given issue. The burden
of proof issue is a question of policy and fairness resolved on the basis of experience in

different situations. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 175, at 249-53; 9 J.
EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940).

WIGMORE,
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facie case.' That is, if a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted or a motion for a directed
verdict is based on the absence of allegations or evidence as to bad
faith or fault, should such a motion be granted? Since the Court has
construed section 1983 as purely a remedial statute' 7 9 the answer
should turn on whether one can establish the violation of a constitutional right without establishing wrongful intent or fault on the part of
the actor. The Supreme Court has recognized the issue but offered little guidance as to its proper resolution.8 0
C.

State of Mind and the Prima Facie Section 1983 Case

Procunier v. Navarette'8 ' evoked expectations that the issue of
whether a section 1983 action could be based on negligence would finally
be resolved. Navarette brought an action against the Director of the
California Department of Corrections and various subordinate and
supervisory officials of Soledad Prison seeking damages for interference and confiscation of his mail from September 1, 1971 to December
11, 1972. One claim for relief asserted "knowing disregard" of prison
regulations and Navarette's constitutional rights. The second claim
asserted a "bad faith disregard for his rights." A third claim asserted
that the three subordinate officers had negligently and inadvertently
misapplied the prison regulations and that the supervisory officers had
negligently failed to provide sufficient training and direction to their
subordinates. 2 The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants on each of these claims. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, inter alia, on the basis that the allegation that state
officers negligently deprived Navarette of his constitutional rights
stated a cognizable cause of action under section 1983. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine "whether the Court of Appeals
correctly reversed the District Court's judgment with respect to
Navarette's third claim for relief alleging negligent interference with a
claimed constitutional right.""'
The opinion subsequently issued by the Court, however, did not address the negligence question. The Court ruled that summary judg178. See Baker v.-McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 n.1 (1979). See also notes 191-229 and accompanying text infra.
179. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 443 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979)
("[Ilt remains true that one cannot go into court and claim a violation of § 1983-for §
'The act only gives a
1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything ....
remedy.' ").
180. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 140.
181. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
182. Id at 557-58.
183. Id. at 565 (footnote omitted).
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ment was properly granted by the district court because the constitutional right allegedly infringed was not "clearly established" at the
time the defendants acted and thus, as a matter of law, the negligence
allegations could not support a conclusion that the officials lost their
qualified immunity.'84
The Supreme Court's focus on qualified immunity in Procunier was
surprising in light of its grant of certiorari to consider the negligence
issue and the obvious need for some exposition on the viability of a
section 1983 action based on negligence. However, the Court's decisions in section 1983 cases over the past fifteen years suggest that it
views the immunity defense as one means of limiting the number of
section 1983 claims and preventing the civil rights act from unduly
hampering the functioning of state officials.'85 Thus, in Procunier, the
Court seized another opportunity to further ebb the flow of section
1983 litigation.
Procunier suggests that some kind of an immunity defense is available to all state officials.' 6 In addition, it reaffirms the view set forth
in Wood v. Strickland'87 that the tests for immunity are both objective
and subjective. Subjectively, the question is whether the official acted
with "malicious intention" to deprive the petitioner of a constitutional
right or to cause him "other injury." The objective test involves three
principal considerations: (1) whether the constitutional right allegedly
infringed by the official was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct; (2) whether the official knew or should have known of
the existence of that right; and (3) whether the official knew or should
have known that his conduct violated the constitutional norm.'88
With respect to the first factor, the Court in Procunier found it unnecessary to specify the basis for determining whether a constitutional
right is clearly established. The Procunier Court noted that the court
of-appeals had relied upon its own decisions which had been rendered
184. Id.
185. See cases cited at notes 22-34 supra.
186. Justice Stevens perceived this implied extension of the qualified immunity
defense and expressed the following concern in his dissenting opinion:
I have no quarrel with the extension of a qualified immunity defense to all state
agents. A public servant who is conscientiously doing his job to the best of his ability should rarely, if ever, be exposed to the risk of damage liability. But when the
Court makes the qualified immunity available to all potential defendants, it is
especially important that the contours of this affirmative defense be explained with
care and precision. Unfortunately, I believe today's opinion significantly changes
the nature of the defense and overlooks the critical importance of carefully examining the factual basis for the defense in each case in which it is asserted.
434 U.S. at 569 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).
188. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 562.
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in 1973 and 1974. Reliance upon these decisions, according to the
Court, was misplaced since the conduct at issue in Procunier occurred
in 1971 and 1972. It followed that there was no clearly established
right stemming from the first and fourteenth amendments with
respect to the protection of correspondence of convicted prisoners.189
With respect to the subjective test for immunity- whether the official
has acted with "malicious intention" to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right or to cause him other injury-the court concluded that
summary judgment was also proper: "To the extent that a malicious intent to harm is a ground for denying immunity, that consideration is
clearly not implicated by the negligence claim now before us."' 90
Procuniercontinues the trend of narrowing the circumstances under
which a plaintiff can obtain compensation for harm caused as a result
of a violation of his constitutional rights. The majority of the Court
elected to avoid the question of whether Navarette's constitutional
rights were, in fact, violated and simply declared that even if such
violation did occur, it did not support an award of compensation under
section 1983 because as a matter of law the defendants enjoyed a qualified immunity under the circumstances.
That Procunier has significantly impaired the effectiveness of section 1983 as a vehicle for seeking compensation is beyond doubt. The
severity of the impairment will depend upon the answers ultimately
provided to the critical questions left open by Procunier: who has the
burden of proof on the good faith issue; when is a constitutional right
"clearly established"; is subjective bad faith synonymous with malice;
are the objective criteria for determining bad faith synonymous with
negligence criteria of reasonable conduct in light of foreseeable risks of
harm; and, what relevance, if any, does the defendant's state of mind
have to a determination of whether plaintiff's constitutional rights
were, in fact, violated? Responses to these inquiries would clarify both
practical litigation problems and general policy issues regarding the
balance of litigants' interests in the adjudication of claims under section 1983. Moreover, resolution of these issues will significantly affect
the viability of section 1983 as a mechanism for determining the
status of an individual's constitutional rights for deterring conduct
violative of constitutional rights and for providing compensation to victims of unconstitutional conduct. Since the majority in Procunier
declined to address these issues directly, it is necessary to scrutinize
carefully Supreme Court and courts of appeals decisions in principal
section 1983 cases for indications of the position the Supreme Court is
likely to advance.
189.
190.

Id. at 565.
Id. at 566.
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Of primary significance is the question of burden of proof on the
good faith issue. Some of the courts of appeals have expressly declared
that good faith is an affirmative defense and that the burden of proving good faith rests with the defendant. 9' Other courts have treated
192
the absence of good faith as part of the plaintiff's prima facie case.
Although the ProcunierCourt, like the Second Circuit, seemed to treat
the good faith determination as if it were an affirmative defense, the
Court has not expressly held that the burden of pleading and proving
good faith is on the defendant. Neither has the Court explained how
such a burden relates to the elements of plaintiff's prima facie case. Instead, in Procunier, the Court ruled that having alleged only negligence, the plaintiff, as a matter of law, could not rebut the defendant's
assertions of objective good faith because the constitutional right he
was asserting was not clearly established at the time the defendants
acted.'93 At the same time, according to the majority, plaintiff did not
need to rebut defendants' assertion of subjective good faith where
plaintiff alleged only negligence.'94
The good faith issue is thus subject to two possible approaches. It
could be treated as a traditional affirmative defense which the defendant must plead and prove to escape liability for conduct which was
prima facie a constitutional tort.'95 Alternatively, it could be treated as
191. See, e.g., Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 239 (3d Cir. 1977); Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); McCray v. Burrell,
516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 426 U.S. 471 (1976); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d
344 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); Green v. Jones, 473 F.2d 660 (9th
Cir. 1973); Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
192. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 603 F.2d 1178, 1182-84 (5th Cir. 1979); Bogard v. Cook, 586
F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978); Hanneman v. Breir, 528 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1976); Hoitt v.
Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 602 (1st Cir. 1974). See also Freed, note 173 supra.
193. 434 U.S. at 565.
194. Id. at 566.
195. Pleading requirements for affirmative defenses have been described as follows:
While there is no simple test for determining what must be affirmatively pleaded,
the rules governing the more commonly recurring defenses have become fairly well
crystallized by precedent, rule, or statute, so that the pleader is likely to find a
ready answer to most of his questions in any particular jurisdiction. Thus, the
federal rules and the Connecticut and New York codes give lists of affirmative
defenses.
JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 175, at 139 (footnotes omitted). With respect to the good
faith of a federal official making an arrest, it has been held: "[I1t is a defense to allege and
prove good faith and reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest and search and in the
necessity for carrying out the arrest and search in the way the arrest was made and the
search was conducted." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972) (on remand from 403 U.S. 388 (1971)) (emphasis
added).
One court has described and approved the following mechanics of pleading and proof in
a Bivens type action:
A plaintiff suing at common law must show that he has suffered an imprisonment
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an element of plaintiffs prima facie case. Under the latter approach, as
in the law of libel, the plaintiff would be required to plead and prove
malice, intent, or negligence to establish a prima facie case.'"
Since many section 1983 claims are challenged on the basis of insufficient allegations or evidence with respect to the defendant's state of
mind, clarification of the burdens of pleading and proof on this
issue is sorely needed. If a showing of a particular state of mind of the
defendant is essential to a finding of a constitutional violation, it would
seem logical and fair to place the burden of pleading and proving the
defendant's mental state on the plaintiff. 9 ' On the other hand, if a
and that the imprisonment was unlawful. The former issue is one of fact, potentially for the injury. Under the law of the District of Columbia, the unlawfulness of
a detention is presumed once "an allegation [is made] that a plaintiff was arrested
and imprisoned without process." The burden then shifts to the defendant to justify
the arrest. Justification can be established by showing that there was probable
cause for arrest of the plaintiff on the grounds charged. A lesser showing can also
be made, namely that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe a
crime had been committed and that plaintiffs arrest was made for the purpose of
securing the administration of the law (ie., that the officer acted in good faith).
Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978) (citations omitted). The court further stated:
Although we know of no case delineating the parameters of a prima fade case
under a Bivens false arrest theory, Pierson v. Ray indicates that the details of the
constitutional tort actions should be shaped by reference to the parallel common
law. The rule recognized in the District that an allegation of arrest and imprisonment without warrant shifts to the defendant the burden of justifying the arrest is
the majority rule in this country and we see no identifiable purpose that would be
served by adopting a different or more stringent definition of a prima fade case in
constitutional litigation.
Id. at 175-76 (citations and footnotes omitted). In support of its statement that an allegation of arrest or imprisonment without warrant shifts the burden of justifying the arrest
to the defendant, the court cited the following authority: Muller v. Reagh, 215 Cal. App.
2d 831, 30 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1963); Wehrman v. Liberty Petroleum Co., 382 S.W.2d 56 (Mo.
App. 1964); Broughton v. New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 335 N.E.2d 310, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, cerL
denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975); 32 AM. JUR. 2d False Imprisonment § 95 (1967); 35 C.J.S.
False Imprisonment § 55 (1960). The Dellums court also noted that "since plaintiffs can be
expected to plead common law false arrest as a pendent claim in constitutional suits, different rules would merely lead to confusion." 566 F.2d at 176.
196. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (a public figure is constitutionally required to prove actual malice in a defamation action; a private person need not
prove actual malice but must prove fault); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (a public official is constitutionally required to prove actual malice in a defamation
action).
197. Only in rare instances does the common law place the burden on the defendant of
pleading and proving the absence of an element essential to plaintiffs prima facie case.
The rare instances where the burden is shi ted to the defendant involve circumstances
revealing an injury suffered by the plaintiff due to someone's tortious conduct and a substantial handicap imposed on the plaintiff with respect to proving the identity of the person who actually committed the tort. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1
(1948); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
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prima facie case of a constitutional tort can be established regardless
of the defendant's mental state, and a particular mental state is a
"defense" which relieves the defendant of liability for damage, then
the burden of pleading and proving that mental state should be placed
on the defendant. 98 In the latter case, the appropriate mechanism
available for disposing of the case prior to trial would be a summary
judgment. However, a summary judgment should issue only if the facts
of the record, based on affidavits, admissions, documents, and depositions, are beyond dispute and establish good faith as a matter of law.'"
Both Supreme Court constitutional tort decisions and the common
law of torts suggest that the burden of proving the defendant's state
of mind in a section 1983 case should rest with the defendant. As noted
above, although the Supreme Court has not expressly declared that
the burden of pleading and proving good faith is on the defendant, it
has consistently described qualified immunity as a "defense."' 2 The
common law of torts does not place the burden on the plaintiff to plead
or prove the absence of a defense 2'o and, if section 1983 claims are to
be viewed against the background of tort law, there is no apparent
reason why such a burden should be placed on the plaintiff who brings
a section 1983 cause of action. It would thus seem that a complaint
alleging a deprivation of a constitutional right under color of state law
should not be dismissed because of a failure to allege that the defendant maliciously, intentionally, or negligently caused the plaintiff to suffer such a deprivation unless the defendant's state of mind is relevant
to the establishment of a prima facie section 1983 claim.
Baker v. McCollan.°. suggests that proof of the defendant's state of
mind may be an essential part of certain types of section 1983 claims.
McCollan involved a plaintiff who had presented evidence which could
have supported a conclusion that he had been detained in jail for eight
days as a result of negligence on the part of the defendant in verifying
his identification. The court of appeals had ruled that the plaintiff was
entitled to submit his case to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed
because, in the view of the majority, the conduct of the defendant did
not violate any specific constitutional right of the plaintiff. In basing
its decision on the absence of an infringement of a specific constitutional right, the Court, as in Procunier,"'deferred consideration of the
question of the viability of a section 1983 action based on simple negli198.

See cases cited at note 195 supra. See also CIVIL

GATION, supra note 40, at 259-61.
199. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.

200.
201.
202.
203.

See cases cited at note 33 supra.

I.
443 U.S. 137 (1979).
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
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gence. In the words of the majority, "[i]f
there has been no such deprivation [of a right secured by the Constitution or laws], the state of
mind of the defendant is wholly immaterial."" ' As an aside, however,
the Court postulated that the state of mind of the defendant may be
important to the issue of whether a constitutional deprivation of a
liberty or property interest has occurred in the first place." 5
This latter intriguing statement confuses the parameters of a section 1983 action and defense. It may suggest that the majority of the
Court is inclined to hold that certain liberty and property interests are
not protected by the Constitution from unintentional invasions. Thus, a
police officer who negligently or unintentionally collides with another
person while he is operating a state vehicle on official business, causing the other person to suffer personal injuries and property damage,
may not have deprived that person of liberty or property without "due
process of law." On the other hand, if the police officer intentionally
drove the state vehicle into another vehicle, this would constitute an
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty or property. 6
Even assuming the validity of such a distinction, the question arises
as to how the burden of proving the defendant's state of mind can be
placed on the plaintiff as a part of his prima facie case, while at the
same time declaring that the defendant's state of mind may establish a
good faith defense which the defendant has the burden of proving.
Such an approach would make sense only if there is some ascertainable
and meaningful difference between the state of mind which the plaintiff must prove in order to make out a prima facie case and the state of
mind that the defendant must prove in order to excuse himself from
liability.
The problem becomes even more complex when one takes into account the Court's suggestion that only some specific constitutional
violations occur as a result of negligence.0 7 Apparently, the Supreme
Court is content to leave lower courts and litigants with the challenging task of identifying potential constitutional violations which occur,
notwithstanding the absence of intent or malice on the part of the actor, and of reconciling the resolution of claims brought for such violations with the elusive standards the Court has articulated for a good
204. 443 U.S. at 140. For a discussion of McCollan in terms of the Supreme Court's
conception of the liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment, see notes
153-156 and accompanying text supra.
205. 443 U.S. at 140 n.1.
206. Cf Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (allegation of deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs required for prisoner to state cognizable claim under § 1983); Beard
v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 494 (7th Cir. 1979) (recklessness required to recover for deprivations of fourteenth amendment rights).
207. 443 U.S. at 140.
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faith defense. The analysis that follows explores the fundamental tortlaw and constitutional standards which must be reconciled if section
1983 is to remain a viable mechanism for redressing constitutional
deprivation.
In a common-law tort case, most claims require proof of either the
defendant's state of mind or the unreasonableness of his conduct in
order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. If the plaintiff
alleges an intentional tort, he must establish that the actor either
desired that his conduct would invade the plaintiff's protected interest
or that the defendant knew with substantial certainty that such invasion would result from his conduct. 28 In a negligence case, the plaintiff
must establish that the defendant foresaw or should have foreseen an
unreasonable risk of his conduct resulting in an invasion of the plain0 9
tiff's protected interest.!
In contrast, in a strict liability tort case, the
state of mind of the actor is irrelevant to the plaintiff's claim. Instead,
the pivotal issue is whether the defendant engaged in an abnormally
dangerous activity or sold a defective product.210
Past decisions under section 1983 have established that certain conduct on the part of persons acting under color of state law may result
in the commission of both a common-law tort and a constitutional
tort." An arrest without probable cause is a classic example. 12 Recognizing this overlap, courts have been careful to note that not all tortious conduct under color of law amounts to a constitutional tort. 13
Beyond the section 1983 requirement that the defendant must have
acted under color of state law, however, the line of demarcation between section 1983 and common-law tort claims has been unclear. The
208.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

8A (1965).

See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 145-49 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
209.

210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966).
211. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 216
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.
1965).
212. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d at 79-80.
213. See Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972), where the court, speaking
through Judge Aldisert, stated:
It becomes important to delineate that conduct which is actionable in state courts
as a tort, and that which is actionable in federal courts under § 1983. The two
rights of action do not always stand in pari materia. Some common law and statutory torts, although actionable in a state forum, do not rise to constitutional dimensions. The converse is equally true. Conduct may be actionable as a deprivation of
constitutional rights where no force and violence has been utilized, and there exists
no orthodox counterpart of state common law.
Id at 278. For a discussion of the various criteria proposed by commentators for distinguishing constitutional torts from common law torts, see Liability for Negligence, note
166 supra.
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Supreme Court, in its most recent effort to define the line of demarcation, has emphasized that the section 1983 remedy is available only
where a party has been deprived of "rights secured by the Constitution."21 ' Consequently, the question whether deprivation of rights
"secured by the Constitution" are dependent on the state of
mind of
the person acting under color of state law emerges as an important
consideration."'5 If the deprivation of any constitutional right is so
dependent, the actor's state of mind may be relevant to three different
aspects of a section 1983 case: proof of a violation of a constitutional
right; proof of the good faith defense; 8 and proof of the mental state
justifying an award of punitive damages." 7
The McCollan"8 Court perceived the issue as sufficiently important
and complex to warrant additional consideration by lower courts prior
to the Supreme Court reaching a conclusion. 19 The Court's inclination
to approach the issue in this manner would be consistent with the view
that the relevance of the defendant's state of mind to the existence of
a prima facie section 1983 claim may not be susceptible to a uniform
answer as to all constitutional rights."0 Litigants and lower courts
should thus carefully analyze the interests protected and conduct prohibited directly by the fourteenth amendment due process clause and
by the particular provisions of the Bill of Rights incorporated through
the fourteenth amendment.
Analysis suggests that it is useful to approach the state of mind
issue by dividing fourteenth amendment rights into two categories:
rights secured by specific provisions of the Bill of Rights incorporated
214. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
215. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 140; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);
Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1972).
216. See text accompanying notes 230-251 infra.
217. See text accompanying notes 287-295 infra.
218. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
219. The majority of the Court in Baker limited their inquiry to whether the petitioner's detention violated a specific provision of the Bill of Rights. While concurring in
the result reached, Mr. Justice Blackmun expressed a willingness to undertake a broader
inquiry in a case involving a law enforcement official's deliberate and repeated refusal to
investigate a prisoner's claim of mistaken identity by referring to available mugshots and
fingerprints. Id. at 148. (Blackmun, J., concurring). See note 155 supra. Justice Stevens, in
a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, would have found that just
as the due process clause protects an individual from conviction based on identifiable procedures which are improperly suggestive, "the Due Process Clause equally requires that
fair procedures be employed to ensure that the wrong individual is not subject to the
deprivations of liberty attaching to pretrial detention." Id. at 153 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens concluded that the absence of a violation of specific provisions of the Bill
of Rights did not preclude this conclusion. Id.
220. 443 U.S. at 140.
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into the due process clause;221 and rights secured directly by the fourteenth amendment due process clause and accorded procedural protection based upon general principles of fundamental fairness and basic
concepts of ordered liberty.222 The defendant's state of mind should not
control the determination of whether a right in the first category has
been violated. As to rights falling within the second category, however, the defendant's state of mind may be determinative.
The propriety and utility of dividing asserted constitutional rights
into these categories for the purpose of assessing the relevance of the
actor's state of mind rests upon considerations of both history and
logic. It is much too late in history for the Court to conclude that
rights secured by specific provisions of the Bill of Rights depend upon
the state of mind of the person who has allegedly violated these constitutional provisions. Conduct which abridges freedom of speech,2 3 effectuates an arrest without probable cause," produces an unreasonable
search and seizure,s or compels a person to testify against himself,2
has been held to violate that person's constitutional rights regardless
of whether the official conduct is characterized as malicious, intentional, reckless or negligent.227 At a minimum, proof that the governmental official has violated the constitutional norms should warrant
declaratory relief or injunctive relief where the evidence shows a likelihood of the conduct continuing. If the actor escapes liability for
221. See cases cited at note 40 supra.
222. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (forcible pumping of a suspect's stomach found to be a violation of due process clause because it "shocks the conscience").
223. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
224. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). At the same time, it should be
noted that the state of mind of the actor may make an otherwise lawful arrest unconstitutional. See Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979) (an arrest under a valid
warrant may give rise to a § 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment if undertaken
for an improper purpose such as intimidating the plaintiff into paying a debt).
225. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
226. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
227. Indeed, if the courts purport to use the terms "intentional" and "negligence" in
the same sense in which they are used in tort cases, careful examination of tort law discloses that the cases most frequently cited as examples of § 1983 claims based on negligence did not, in fact, involve a genuine negligence issue. For an analysis of some specific
cases which illustrate this point see Liability for Negligence, supra note 166, at 283-84. In
tort law, conduct is characterized as "intentional" if the actor desired to invade a legally
cognizable interest of another or knew with substantial certainty that his conduct would
produce such an invasion. A reasonable mistake of fact as to a privilege to invade the interest does not preclude a finding of intent; neither does it change the characterization of
the conduct from intentional to negligent. See PROSSER, supra note 209, at 99-100.
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damages, the escape should be based upon policies which support a
grant of some form of immunity rather than a declaration that no violation of constitutional rights has occurred.
With respect to rights to due process not governed by specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, the determination of the relevance of the
actor's state of mind is more problematic. The relevance of the actor's
state of mind to these claims may be gleaned from the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun in McCollan, in which he suggested that conduct which "shocks the conscience" or is offensive to a "concept of
ordered liberty" may violate a person's right to liberty protected by
the fourteenth amendment due process clause even if it does not
violate a specific provision of the Bill of Rights.' This concept of conduct which may be so "shocking" as to violate due process, together
with the majority's recognition that the "state of mind of the actor
may be relevant to the issue of whether a constitutional violation has
occurred,"' suggests that a claim of a constitutional violation which
does not rest upon specific provisions of the Bill of Rights indeed may
turn upon the state of mind of the actor.
If the preceding analysis is correct, it is possible to achieve a clearer
understanding of the relationship between the standards for a prima
facie section 1983 case and the good faith defense. A plaintiff asserting
a claim which is not based upon a violation of a specific provision of
the Bill of Rights would have to prove either that the defendant acted
with malice or that the knowledge which the defendant had or should
have had about the probability and degree of constitutional or other
deprivation attendant to his conduct made his conduct so shocking to
the conscience or so "offensive to the concept of ordered liberty" that
it constituted a due process violation. In this situation, proof of the
prima facie case would effectively refute a good faith defense because
the standards of each are synonymous, the difference being one of procedure; the plaintiff would have the burden of proving the equivalent
of an absence of good faith in order to establish a prima facie case.
On the other hand, a plaintiff who relies on a specific provision of
the Bill of Rights should not be required to plead or prove anything as
to the state of mind of the actor in order to establish a constitutional
violation. Proof that the defendant, acting under color of state law,
violated a provision of the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, should be sufficient to establish a
prima facie case under section 1983. This does not mean, however, that
the defendant will be held liable for damages caused by such deprivation, for the defendant remains capable of excusing himself from a
228.
229.

443 U.S. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See note 219 supra.
443 U.S. at 140 n.1.
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damage award by proving good faith, and the standards for the good
faith defense protect a defendant from financial liability for innocently,
and perhaps negligently, inflicted constitutional deprivations. The
point is that the plaintiff in such a case has alleged or proved enough
to compel the defendant to offer good reasons why he should not have
to pay for the injury.
The validity and utility of this conceptual model of the section 1983
prima facie case are best demonstrated by a careful review and assessment of the Supreme Court's opinions which set forth the standards of
the good faith defense.
D.

The Good Faith Defense

The Court in Wood v. Strickland"0 described the good faith defense
as involving both subjective and objective considerations. Subjectively,
the defendant must establish that he did not act with a "malicious intention" to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right or to cause
2 1
Objectively, the defendant must establish that he
him "other injury.""
neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights." 2 Since proof of both of these factors allows
the official to escape liability for damages, requiring a plaintiff who has
alleged or proved a violation of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights
also to prove the state of mind of the actor needlessly confuses litigation under section 1983 and achieves an improper balance of the interests at stake.
The confusion arises from the overlap involved in the plaintiffs
proof of intent or negligence as a part of his prima facie case and the
defendant's proof of good faith as a defense against a damage claim.
The criteria for good faith outlined by the Supreme Court substantially
track the common-law tort criteria for intent and negligence. In Procunier, the Supreme Court acknowledged the similarity of the criteria
for the subjective branch of good faith with the tort criteria for intentional injury when it commented as to the meaning of malicious intention: "This part of the rule speaks of 'intentional injury,' contemplating
that the actor intends the consequences of his conduct."" Additionally,
although the Court has not acknowledged the substantial similarity of
the criteria for the objective branch of good faith to tort-law criteria
for negligence, a review of the Court's pronouncements on the objective branch of good faith reveals the similarity.
230.
231.
232.
233.

420 U.S. 308 (1975).
Id. at 322.
Id.
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 566.
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The common theme that emerges from Scheuer v. Rhodes, ' Wood
v. Strickland' and O'Connor v. Donaldson' is that for immunity purposes, a state official should be held to an objective standard based on
what a reasonable person carrying out the duties of the official would
do under the circumstances in light of the foreseeable risks of harm.
The Court in Scheuer stated that the scope of the immunity defense
varies "dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of
the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the
time." '37 Wood holds that a school board member "must be held to a
standard of conduct based not only on permissible intentions, but also
on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his
charges.2138 In O'Connor, the Court declared that in determining
whether a hospital superintendent acted in good faith under the objective branch of the Wood test, "the relevant question for the jury is
whether O'Connor knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of [Donaldson]."' z Finally, in both Wood and
O'Connor, the Court emphasized that "an official has, of course, no
duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments."2
Thus far, the criteria for immunity for engaging in reasonable conduct in light of foreseeable risks of harm is essentially the same as the
common-law criteria for negligence. Two statements of the Court in its
principal immunity decisions which may be read as significantly deviating from negligence criteria are found in Scheuer and Procunier. In
Scheuer, the Court attempted to articulate different criteria for immunity of high and low level officials. The Court stated that low level
officers and enlisted personnel of the national guard could escape
liability by showing that they had "acted in good faith obedience to the
orders of their superiors."' " Under negligence law, the low officers'
liability would turn on whether a reasonable person acting under the
same or similar circumstances would have followed the order. 22 In Procunier, the Court refused to consider whether prison officials acted
reasonably in interfering with a prisoner's mail on the ground that the
prisoner's constitutional right to freedom from such interference was
234. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
235. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
236. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
237. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 247.
238. 420 U.S. at 322.
239. 422 U.S. at 577.
240. M See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 322.
241. 416 U.S. at 250.
242. This is, in essence, a problem of conflicting duties; i.e., a duty to follow orders
and a duty not to intentionally or negligently harm others.
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not "clearly established" at the time the officials acted." 3 Negligence
law, however, would treat the clarity or lack of clarity of establishment of the asserted right as a factor to consider in determining
whether the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances in
light of the foreseeable risk of harm.
The problems engendered by the Court's adherence to these statements from Scheuer and Procunier without further clarification have
been amply articulated.2 " The statement from Scheuer has been read
as immunizing low level officials from liability merely on the basis of
obedience to orders. Yet the Court obviously could not have intended
such a construction. For example, a police officer who, on orders of his
superior, broke into someone's home without a warrant and without
probable cause, could not escape liability if, at the time he acted, he
was aware that his superior was giving the order based solely on
suspicion or to fulfill a personal vendetta. Good faith obedience, then,
should be governed by the requirement of reasonable conduct under
the circumstances.4 5
The problem with attributing great weight to the "clearly established constitutional right" requirement set forth in Procunier is that
the Supreme Court offers little guidance as to when a constitutional
right is to be considered "clearly established." Since constitutional provisions are deliberately drafted in broad terms to reflect fundamental
societal values, the phrase "clearly established" arguably can be of
significance in resolving claims only if it refers to prior judicial
declarations applying particular provisions to particular factual claims.
Yet to hold that constitutional right is not clearly established unless
the claim in issue comports "on all fours" with the applicable facts of a
prior decision establishing the right by the Supreme Court or court of
appeals in a particular circuit 4 1 is contrary to both Anglo-American
243. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 565.
244. See Theis, supra note 173, at 297-98 (criticizing Scheuer as both "too harsh and
too lenient").
245. This view is indirectly supported by a recent decision of a federal district court
holding that a prison guard's right to refuse an order that would result in the violation of
another's constitutional rights is a "right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws" and thus cognizable under § 1983. Harley v. Schuylkill County, 476 F.
Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The court reasoned that the guard had a clear duty to refrain
from acting in a manner that would deprive another of a constitutional right. Id. at 194.
246. See, e.g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 431 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1977), where
the court declared: "In the absence of a Supreme Court case or an opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit creating a particular constitutional right, it
would be unreasonable to require a president of a state college in Pennsylvania to know
that his actions violated the Constitution." Id. at 1390-91. This construction of the law was
later expressly approved by the Third Circuit. See Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 590 F.2d
470, 493 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 61 (1979).
Other courts have construed the "clearly settled rights" requirement in a similarly re-
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jurisprudence and common sense."" Thus, given a general judicial construction of a constitutional provision, lawyers and judges frequently
conclude that certain conduct is clearly unconstitutional without the
necessity of a prior judicial decision holding that the provision applies
to the precise facts under review.
This view prompted one court to conclude that an official may not
take solace in "ostrichism" merely because the conduct involved in the
disputed factual setting has never been held unconstitutional so long
as selected principles would inexorably lead to the conclusion that the
conduct would be unconstitutional. "8 It seems evident that to allow an
official to escape liability for unconstitutional conduct simply because
the Supreme Court or court of appeals has not ruled that a constitutional provision prohibits specific conduct produces a substantial injustice if prior judicial decisions would have led a reasonable person to
conclude with substantial certainty that the conduct was violative of
the Constitution. To subject an official's conduct to scrutiny under this
test of foreseeability offends none of the purposes of the immunity
defense." 9
stricted manner. See, e.g., Raffone v. Robinson, 607 F.2d 1058, 1062 (2d Cir. 1979) (one
district court decision does not clearly establish a right); Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172
(5th Cir. 1975) (court cites cogency of dissent in prior court of appeals decision on a similar
issue as a basis for concluding that the constitutional right was not clearly established);
Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 578 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976) (because the first definitive holding that termination of
teachers' property interests in their employment contracts with state institutions required due process hearings was issued subsequent to the defendants' termination of college president's contract in 1970, his constitutional right to a hearing was not clearly
established; the precedents considered by the court were limited to Supreme Court decisions); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1037 (1977) (courts were split on issue and defendant relied on advice of counsel);
Collins v. Bessinger, 374 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ill.), affd mem., 506 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1974),
cerL denied, 422 U.S. 1058 (1975).
247. See Freed, supra note 173, at 558-62 (criticizing "clearly established right" requirement as overly protective of culpable executive officials, inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983, not compelled by the policy against surprise liability, and as encouraging
an approach of avoiding deciding the merits of constitutional issues); Kattan, supra note
173, at 982-86 (arguing that defendants who have demonstrated no awareness of constitutional rights of the persons affected should not be absolved of liability because the law is
not "settled" and suggesting that if the official has relied on the state of the law the focus
should be on whether the official made an informed decision); Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 36, at 1215-16 ("the 'clearly settled rights' prong of the liability test
should be utilized sparingly ... to find liability, apart from the other factors indicative of
reasonableness of official action, where the character of the right violated is so clearly settled that ignorance of it simply cannot be excused").
248. Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932
(1978). See also Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
249. A state official who has acted under circumstances which would have led a
reasonable person in his position to conclude with substantial certainty that his conduct
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In short, the criteria used for determining good faith under the objective branch of Wood should approximate the negligence criteria of
reasonable conduct in light of foreseeable risks of harm. If the issue is
raised whether the constitutional right involved was clearly established, the court should determine whether prior judicial decisions
would have led a reasonable person to conclude that the constitutional
right existed. If that is answered affirmatively, the fact finder should
proceed to determine whether the defendant knew or should have
known of the existence of that right and that his conduct would deprive plaintiff of that right. In a section 1983 case based upon the
violation of a fourteenth amendment right that finds its content in a
specific provision of the Bill of Rights, the burden of proving unforeseeability of the constitutional deprivation should be on the defendant.
The following considerations lend support to this approach. The
Supreme Court has stated that the primary purpose of section 1983 is
to provide compensation to persons who have suffered deprivation of
constitutional rights.5 0 At the same time, the good faith defense has
been deemed necessary to assure that the threat of section 1983 actions does not unduly deter an official from properly carrying out his
governmental duties and to avoid the injustice of imposing liability on
an officer who is required by his office to exercise discretion.2 51 State
officials are obviously in a superior position to produce evidence regarding their state of mind and the information available to them at
the time of their conduct. Therefore, to require plaintiffs, who have
properly pleaded and proved a constitutional violation, to also plead
and prove that the actor who effectuated the constitutional deprivation
did so intentionally or negligently would allow such officials to escape
liability for harm caused by unconstitutional conduct without showing
that the reasons supporting the immunity defense are applicable to the
facts involved. Once a constitutional violation has been pleaded or
established, it seems more consistent with the purpose of section 1983
and the interests at stake to treat matters relating to the defendant's
state of mind or the reasonableness of his conduct as matters relating
solely to the good faith defense.
In contrast, if the section 1983 claim is not based on a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, plaintiff should bear the burden of proving
unreasonable conduct, and this may necessitate proof that the defendant acted with the desire to deprive him of a constitutional right or to
was violative of constitutional norms cannot reasonably contend that the imposition of
liability is unfair or that it will unduly deter responsible and conscientious officials from
properly performing their official duties.
250. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978).
251. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
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cause him some other injury. In such a case, proof of plaintiffs claim
will refute the defendant's claim of good faith.
There remains the important question of the scope of the immunity
defense, if any, which will be afforded local governmental bodies after
Monell v. Department of Social Services.52 In MoneU1, the Supreme
Court, overruling Monroe, held that a local government is a "person"
within the meaning of section 1983.2" The Court further held that a
local government is subject to damages for a section 1983 violation
"when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by
its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury."25 ' At the same time, the
Court concluded that "a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."'
The Monell Court also stated that municipal bodies were not entitled to absolute immunity, but expressly left open the question of the
scope of any qualified immunity. ' The lower courts which addressed
the issue subsequent to Monell reached different conclusions- some
affording the municipality the same good faith immunity as its officials
and others ruling that the municipality was not entitled to any qualified immunity." 7
In Owen v. City of Independence,25 the Supreme Court resolved the
conflict, holding that a municipality may not assert the good faith of its
officers or agents as a defense to liability under section 1983. The
Owen court rested its decision on history and policy. Justice Brennan,
writing for a five member majority, declared that at the time section
1983 was enacted local government bodies did not enjoy a qualified immunity from tort liability based on the good faith of its officers.2 59 In
light of this fact, the Court was unwilling to assume that Congress sub
silentio extended such a qualified immunity to municipalities.'
252. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
253. Id. at 663.
254. Id. at 694.
255. Id. at 691.
258. Id. at 701.
257. Most of the lower courts that have considered this issue have held that a good
faith immunity applies to municipalities and have included the clearly established constitutional right requirement. See Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980); Sala v.
County of Suffolk, 604 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded mem., 48 U.S.L.W.
3673-74 (1980); Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct.
0000 (1980); Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979). Contra, Kingsville Independent School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980); Bertot v. School
Dist. No. 1, 613 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1979). See generally Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation
after Monett, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 213 (1979).
258. 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980).
259. Id. at 1410.
260. Id. at 1415.
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In addition, in the view of the majority, the two mutually dependent
rationales for granting a qualified immunity for executive officers did
not support the granting of a good faith immunity to municipalities.
First, there is no injustice in holding a municipality liable in damages
for injuries that it has inflicted on an individual through an invasion of
his constitutional rights because "it is the public at large which enjoys
the benefits of the government's activities, and it is the public at large
which is ultimately responsible for its administration..... Second, to the
extent that a potential monetary liability compels the municipality's
decisionmakers to consider the constitutional rights of individuals who
will be affected by the municipality's actions, one of the fundamental
purposes of section 1983 is being served."'
Beyond the resolution of the conflict regarding the qualified immunity for local government bodies, Owen answers the question of whether
a section 1983 action will be recognized in the absence of fault. The
majority of the court stated that a strict liability section 1983 action
will lie against a local governmental body to recover for an injury
6
caused by the execution of that local government's policy or custom."
After Owen, the principal tasks remaining for the Court with respect to the clarification of standards for section 1983 liability include:
a resolution of the question of which party bears the burden of pleading and proving the defendant's state of mind in actions brought
against individual officers; u and a determination of the relevance, if
any, of the individual governmental official's state of mind to the issue
of whether a constitutional violation has occurred. 5 Hopefully, clarification of these issues in conjunction with the Court's new accommodation of interests -protecting individual officers from personal liability
in the absence of bad faith and making governmental bodies liable for
executing unconstitutional policies and customs-will make the Court
less inclined to continue the course of construing constitutional rights
as a means of controlling the section 1983 remedy.
III.

TAILORING SECTION 1983 REMEDIES TO THE
INTEREST PROTECTED

The prior sections explored the elements of a prima facie section
1983 action and the qualified immunity or good faith defense. The most
troublesome issues in this regard involve the identification of liberty
and property interests protected by the fourteenth amendment, the
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 1417.
Id. at 1418.
Id. at 1418-19.
See discussion at notes 191-201 and accompanying text supra.
See discussion at notes 202-229 and accompanying text supra.
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determination of whether the constitutional right against infringement
of an interest was clearly established at the time the defendant acted,
and the determination of whether the defendant knew or should have
known that such a constitutional right existed and that his conduct
would violate that right. Once these issues are resolved, questions concerning the appropriate remedies and damages for section 1983 violations still remain. Because Carey v. Piphus'" is likely to substantially
affect the future development of remedies and damages for section
1983 violations, a detailed consideration of that case is necessary.
Carey presented the issue of whether students suspended from public elementary and secondary schools without required procedural due
process were entitled to recover substantial nonpunitive damages if
their suspensions were justified and they did not prove that any other
injury was caused by the denial of procedural due process. The
Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that "in
the absence of proof of actual injury, the students are entitled to
recover only nominal damages."267
In Carey, a student was suspended because the principal observed
him and other students smoking an irregularly shaped cigarette which
the principal surmised to be marijuana. Another student whose case
was under review in Carey was suspended for wearing an earring in
violation of the principal's directive that such ornaments not be worn
because he had concluded that they were symbols of gang participation. In each instance, the student was suspended summarily without a
hearing which the Court found to be guaranteed by the due process
clause. In each case, the district court found that the school officials
were not entitled to qualified immunity from damages because they
should have known that lengthy suspensions without any adjudicative
hearing would violate due process, but declined to award damages
because the record was devoid of any evidence to form a basis for
measuring the extent of the student's injuries. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, ruling, inter alia, in
both circumstances that even if the district court found that the students' suspensions were justified they would be entitled to recover
substantial nonpunitive damages based on the procedural due process
violations.
The students advanced two principal arguments to the Supreme
Court in support of the court of appeals' holding. First, they contended
that because constitutional rights are valuable in and of themselves,
and because there is a need to deter violations of constitutional rights,
substantial damages should be awarded under section 1983 for the
266.
267.

435 U.S. 247 (1978).

I& at 248.
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deprivation of such constitutional rights regardless of whether any
actual injury was caused by the deprivation. Second, they argued that
even if the purpose of section 1983 damage awards is to compensate
for injuries, every deprivation of procedural due process could be presumed to cause some injury.
In rejecting the first argument, the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Powell, stated that "[t]o the extent that Congress intended that
awards under section 1983 should deter the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory
damages."2 With respect to the argument that damages should be presumed, the Court noted that unlike the common law of defamation per
se-which is characterized as an oddity of tort law in that damages are
presumed-it is not reasonable to assume that every departure from
procedural due process, no matter what the circumstances or how
minor, is as likely to cause distress as is the publication of defamation
per se to cause injury to reputation and distress. If a deprivation of a
protected interest is substantially justified, the Court noted, there well
may be those who suffer no distress as a result of procedural irregularities. Moreover, until such time as a person enlists the aid of counsel, he may not even know procedural deficiencies have occurred. In
addition, the Court stated, "where a deprivation is justified but procedures are deficient, whatever distress a person feels may be attributable to the justified deprivation rather than to deficiencies in procedure."2 "9 The Court noted that if a person is upset because of a
justified deprivation, there will not be a compensable injury. Thus, the
difficulty of determining whether the plaintiff's mental distress is due
to improper procedures rather than a justified deprivation provides an
additional reason for insisting upon proof of actual harm in this context.
To allay concern that this decision would emasculate section 1983 as
an effective remedy for procedural due process violations, the Court,
at various points in the opinion, pointed to several factors which, in its
view, supported section 1983 as a viable remedy for violations of procedural due process. First, the Court emphasized that a denial of due
process remains actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.27 Next, the Court espoused the view that injured persons
should have no particular difficulty in proving that emotional distress
was caused by the denial of due process since distress is a personal injury which is familiar to the law and is customarily proved by showing
268.
269.
270.

Id at 256.
Id at 263.
Id at 266.
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the nature and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff ' The Court emphasized that it was not holding that "exemplary
or punitive damages might not be awarded in a proper case under section 1983 with a specific purpose of deterring or punishing violations of
'
Finally, the Court found it significant that
constitutional rights."272
defendants who violate procedural due process rights face potential
liability for attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976.2"
Since seven Justices of the Supreme Court joined in the Carey opinion, it would appear that the Court's ruling, that substantial nonpunitive damages for procedural due process violations are not recoverable
in the absence of any proof of actual injury, is likely to stand for some
time. Projection of the impact of this decision on section 1983 actions
in general requires a careful examination of two basic issues. First, is
the holding that damages cannot be presumed from a showing of a
"mere" violation of procedural due process likely to be extended? Second, what circumstances justify an award of punitive damages in a section 1983 action, and how are such damages to be measured?
A.

The Impact of Carey on Section 1983 Claims

The compensation principle espoused by the Supreme Court in
Carey is likely to diminish the ability of all persons to recover for procedural due process violations. The general impact of Carey is likely to
be seen in terms of litigation strategies. Since a showing of a procedural due process violation will not support a presumption of
damages, plaintiffs will be required to introduce at trial evidence that
they suffered some sort of injury such as mental distress or economic
loss as result of the procedural due process violation." Defendants will
be permitted to introduce evidence to prove that even if the plaintiff
had been afforded procedural due process the same deprivation of a right
would have been justified. This will require a determination on the
merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, with the defendant, presumably,
271. Id. at 263-64.
272. Id. at 257 n.11.
273. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
274. For illustrations of the impact of Carey on damage claims see Perez v. Rodriguez
Bou, 575 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1978) (affirming district court's award of nominal damages to
students suspended without due process because the only evidence of actual injury was
the plaintiffs' own statements that they experienced some psychological discomfort as a
result of the suspension); Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1978) (teacher suspended in
violation of procedural due process entitled to only nominal damages in absence of proof
of actual injury); Huntley v. Community School Bd., 579 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1978) (award of
nominal damages for denial of due process in termination of principal's employment could
not be characterized as inadequate).
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bearing the burden of proof. 5 Consequently, instead of simply mustering the resources to establish the existence of a constitutionally protected interest which entitled him to some form of a hearing, the plaintiff must be prepared to litigate the merits of the substantive claim
itself.
If a determination is reached that a procedural due process hearing
would have been of no consequence with respect to the deprivation of
the substantive right, then plaintiff will be required to assert a right
to damages on the following grounds. Plaintiff must claim distress and
indignation based upon the failure to afford him a fair hearing. If the
defendant can establish that he would have been justified in depriving
plaintiff of liberty or property even if the plaintiff had been afforded
due process, the case in which plaintiff will be able to establish that he
suffered mental distress, indignation, or some other compensable injury caused by the procedural due process violation will be rare, if
ever.27 Alternatively, the plaintiff may attempt to prove that the
deprivation of a fair hearing was prompted by malice, thus warranting
the imposition of punitive damages.
In light of the substantial impediment that the Carey compensation
principle poses for plaintiffs seeking recovery of compensatory
damages for procedural due process violations, it becomes important to
evaluate the likely impact of the Carey principle on other section 1983
claims. The Court's ruling that damages could not be presumed was
limited to procedural due process claims in the Carey case. Lower
court opinions subsequent to Carey, however, have applied the same
ruling to other kinds of section 1983 claims.277 Such application is in
part prompted by the Supreme Court's rationale in Carey that to the
extent that Congress intended section 1983 to serve a deterrent purpose, there is no evidence that it intended such deterrence to be accomplished by means other than the ordinary award of compensatory
damages. Yet the rationale employed by the Court in Carey suggests
that the rule enunciated in that decision should not be extended to sec275. The Supreme Court in Carey approved the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit that if defendants could prove that the students would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been held, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to
recover for damages caused by the suspension. 435 U.S. at 260.
276. It will be a rare case in which plaintiff is able to convince the court that although
he was not entitled to maintain the particular property or liberty interest involved, his
emotional distress related not to the deprivation of the interest but to the failure of the
defendant to use appropriate procedures.
277. See, e.g., Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916
(1979) (prisoner who claimed prison officials transferred him from minimum security facility to maximum security facility offered sufficient evidence of actual damages in form of
his testimony as to less desirable circumstances at maximum security facility and thus
district court erred in holding that he did not prove any damages).
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tion 1983 claims asserting violations of substantive constitutional
rights. The Carey decision was based upon the concept that procedural
due process serves primarily the function of protecting other substantive rights. Having embraced this view, the Court declared that the
primary concern of damage awards for such section 1983 claims should
be with the wrongful deprivation of a property or liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Such reasoning suggests that the
Carey rule of disallowing substantive awards in the absence of proof of
actual 8 harm should be strictly limited to procedural due process
cases. 2
The common law of torts has traditionally permitted an award of
substantial damages when certain dignitary interests have been invaded, even in the absence of proof of any special damages. 9 In tort
law, general damages are characterized as those damages which generally flow from the substantive wrong committed by the defendant. 20
Additionally, it is recognized that invasion of certain kinds of interests
more probably than not produce indignation and distress. Offensive
contact with another's body stands as a classic example of a tort where
substantial damages are permitted even in the absence of a'ny special
harm having been caused to the plaintiff. 1 Such an award is justified
on the grounds that proof of damages in monetary terms is difficult
and often impractical with respect to these kinds of wrongs. Nevertheless, it is recognized that some real harm was more probably than not
caused by tortious conduct such as a spit in the face. The same reasoning would seem to apply to deprivation involving speech, voting, illegal
arrest, and illegal seizure of property. From a policy point of view, it
appears clearly wrong to allow a defendant who is engaged in conduct
that has deprived another of a substantive constitutional right to
escape damage liability based upon the plaintiffs inability to muster
proof which establishes actual harm. Proof of deprivation of a substantive constitutional right would by itself support a finding that the
plaintiff has in fact suffered actual harm.
Assuming that the compensation principle and the rule of no presumption of damages applies beyond the procedural due process context, the development of appropriate standards for the award of punitive damages becomes critical in maintaining the efficacy of section
278. See CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 40, at 99-100; Damage
Awards for ConstitutionalTorts, supra note 36, at 985-90 (proposing the application of the
voting rights model as a system for measuring damages for constitutional violations).
279. See D. DOBBS, LAW oF REMEDIES 528-31 (1973) (describing "dignitary" claims as involving "invasions of intangible interests rather than ... invasions of physical or economic
interests") [hereinafter cited as DOBBS].
280. Id. at 138.
281. Id. at 528.
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1983 actions for purposes of deterring deprivations of rights under
color of state law. In this regard, there are a number of issues regarding punitive damages that require resolution.
B.

Punitive Damages

As noted above, the Supreme Court in Carey adopted the view that
"the basic purpose of a section 1983 award should be to compensate
persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional
'
rights."282
Thus, at least in the context of due process claims, an award
of compensatory damages must be fashioned to redress actual harm
suffered and cannot be justified solely on the basis of deterring future
violations of constitutional rights.
This restriction on awards of compensatory damages, together with
"the apparent trend of decisions curtailing the powers of federal courts
to impose equitable remedies to terminate such violations,"2' 8 increases
the significance of punitive damages as a mechanism for deterring constitutional violations. The Supreme Court was careful to note in Carey
that it was not saying "that exemplary or punitive damages might not
be awarded with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing viola'
tions of constitutional rights."284
The Court, however, did state that the
Carey decision implied "no approval or disapproval" of any of the decisions of lower federal courts cited as examples of past decisions approving punitive damage awards. 5 The only explicit guidance the
Court offered on the punitive damage issue was that such damages
could not be awarded in a case such as Carey because "[t]he District
Court specifically found that petitioners did not act with malicious
intention to deprive respondents of their rights or to do them other injury . . . and the Court of Appeals approved only the award of nonpunitive damages." '
We may thus infer that a punitive damage award is appropriate at
least in cases in which the defendant has acted with a "malicious intention to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right or to cause him other
injury." This inference creates the obvious problems of defining the
phrase "malicious intention" and of determining whether punitive
damages may be awarded on the basis of any factual finding other than
a malicious intention.
In Procunier the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of "malicious intention" in the context of a qualified immunity claim. The
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 253-54.
Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978).
435 U.S. at 257 n.11.
Id. at 265.
Id.
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Court there stated: "This part of the rule speaks of "intentional
injury,' contemplating that the actor intends the consequences of his
conduct."" 7 In support of that conclusion, the Court cited section 8A of
the Second Restatement of Torts, which provides that "[t]he word 'intent' is used throughout the Restatement of this subject to denote that
the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he
believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from
it."2"5 Thus, it seems to follow that, at least for immunity purposes, the
phrase "malicious intention" approximates the common-law tort definition of "intent." Accordingly, proof of "ill will" or bad motive should
not be required to show a malicious intention. Proof that a constitutional violation was substantially certain to result from defendant's
conduct or that he acted in reckless disregard of this consequence
should suffice."5
Consideration of the purposes of punitive damages supports the
view that punitive damages may be imposed for section 1983 violations
even in the absence of proof of "ill will." A generally accepted description of the purposes of a punitive damage award is found in a recent
decision' in which the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled
that punitive damages may be awarded to punish persons who have engaged in particularly egregious conduct and to deter such conduct in
the future."' Both purposes are appropriately served where punitive
damages are imposed on an actor who has intentionally or recklessly
violated another's constitutional rights.
In Carey, the Court ruled that punitive damages were inappropriate
because the district court found that the defendants did not act with
"malicious intention." Thus, Carey could be read as rejecting recklessness as a basis for a punitive damage award. Although the Court's
language may support this reading, further analysis of the issue in
light of the purposes of punitive damage awards suggests that the
Court would be hard-pressed to reach this conclusion if the issue were
fully considered.
Moreover, consideration of the protection from any liability for
damages which an official enjoys under the immunity defense lends
further support for a punitive damage award based on reckless conduct. A state official may lose his immunity on the ground that he
287.

Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 566.

288.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

8A (1965).

289. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 233 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
290. Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1978).
291. Id. at 106. This view has also been adopted by other courts. See, e.g., Silver v.
Cormier, 529 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1976); Guzman v. Western State Bank, 540 F.2d 948,
953 (8th Cir. 1976).
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knew or should have known that his conduct would violate another's
constitutional rights. A finding that he should have known that his conduct would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights may rest on a
determination that he acted recklessly or merely negligently.292 While
the distinction between recklessness and negligence is not easily
marked, it can be said that recklessness involves a conscious choice of
a course of action where the state official either knows or has reason
to know of a high probability that the conduct engaged in will result in
a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights or cause him other injury."2 When interests as important as constitutional rights are at
stake, the argument for punishing and deterring persons who engage
in reckless conduct seems compelling. The common law of torts has
treated such conduct as different in kind .and character from ordinary
negligence and has imposed punitive damages for reckless conduct."
Thus, even if tort law is not controlling in a section 1983 action,29 it
292. A comment to § 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides as follows:
Both the expression "reason to know" and "should know" are used with respect
to existent facts. These two phrases, however, differ in that "reason to know" implies no duty of knowledge on the part of the actor whereas "should know" implies
that the actor owes another the duty of ascertaining the fact in question. "Reason
to know" means that the actor has knowledge of facts from which a reasonable man
of ordinary intelligence or one of the superior intelligence of the actor would either
infer the existence of the fact in question or would regard its existence as so highly
probable that his conduct would be predicated upon the assumption that the fact
did exist. "Should know" indicates that the actor is under a duty to another to use
reasonable diligence to ascertain the existence or non-existence of the fact in question and that he would ascertain the existence thereof in the proper performance of
that duty. Both the phrases "reason to know" and "should know" are used throughout the Restatement of Torts in the same sense as they are used in the Restatement of Agency. (See Restatement of Agency, Second, § 9.)
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12, Comment a (1965). Thus, if the Supreme Court is
using the phrase "should have known" in the broad sense in which it is used in tort law,
the conclusion that the state official "should have known" that his conduct was violative of
constitutional norms may rest on two different findings. One finding would be that the
state official had knowledge of facts from which he should have either inferred that his
contemplated conduct would be unconstitutional or regarded the probability of the conduct being unconstitutional as so high that he should have predicated his conduct upon
that assumption. The other finding would be that the state official had knowledge of facts
which placed him under a duty to use reasonable diligence to ascertain the constitutionality of his contemplated conduct prior to acting. In the first situation, the conduct
amounts to recklessness and the official may be subject to punitive damages. See notes
293-294 infra. In the latter situation, the conduct amounts to ordinary negligence and
should not subject the official to punitive damages.

293.

See

294.

For example, contributory negligence is no defense if the defendant engaged in

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

reckless conduct. RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).
295.

§ 500, Comment g (1965).

(SECOND) OF TORTS

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 258.

§ 482(1) (1965);
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seems appropriate to apply this same treatment to conduct which
deprives persons of constitutional rights. Punitive damages should
thus be permissible in a section 1983 case where the defendant has
acted with reckless disregard of the constitutional rights of another.
As noted above, the record in Carey did not evoke adequate consideration of this issue.
The question remains how punitive damages are to be measured.
There are several rules applied in tort cases that courts must evaluate
to determine their appropriateness in section 1983 actions. One rule
provides that punitive damages must be proportionate to the amount
of actual damages.' A corollary to this rule, adopted in some jurisdictions, is that no punitive damages may be awarded in the absence of
some proof of actual damages. 7 Another rule provides that the wealth
of the defendant is a factor to be considered in assessing the amount of
punitive damages."
In Basista,2" the leading decision on the issue of punitive damages in
a section 1983 action, the Third Circuit held that the award of damages
in a section 1983 action was governed by federal law."o The court further ruled that in a section 1983 action punitive damages may be
awarded in the absence of proof of actual damages."' Basista has been
followed by courts in other circuits"2 and was recently reaffirmed by
the Third Circuit."° The wisdom of both rulings in Basista becomes
clear when one considers the differences in state court approaches to
punitive damages along with the recent Carey decision. To allow the
availability of punitive damages to vary from state to state would
create a situation where the degree to which plaintiff's constitutional
rights are protected by judicial remedies depends on which state plaintiff happens to be in at any given time. This would impede one of the
basic purposes of section 1983 of providing a federal remedy for the
redress of constitutional deprivations which is independent of any particular state's predilection.'"
Perhaps more important, if states were permitted to adopt a rule
precluding the imposition of punitive damages in the absence of proof
296. See DOBBS, supra note 279, at 210-11.
297. Id at 208-10.
298. Id. at 218-19.
299. 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
300. Id. at 86.
301. Id. at 88.
302. Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1978); Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161,
163 (10th Cir. 1976); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974).
303. Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1978).
304. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). But see notes 82-158 and accompanying
text supra, discussing recent Supreme Court decisions that adopt reasoning inconsistent
with the view that § 1983 provides an independent federal remedy.

470

Duquesne Law Review

Vo1.18:409

of actual harm, a perpetrator of oppressive and outrageous conduct
violative of procedural due process could often escape monetary liability because he could prove that affording due process would not
have prevented state officials from depriving plaintiff of liberty or
property. The same result would follow if plaintiff were unable to prove
that he suffered mental distress or some other identifiable injury
because of the procedural due process violation. Although deterrence
may not be the primary goal of the section 1983 remedy, it certainly
should be considered, and punitive damages consequently should be imposed when a defendant intentionally or recklessly deprives plaintiff of
procedural due process or some other constitutional right.
By allowing an award of punitive damages in the absence of proof of
actual harm, the court in Basista also rejected the common-law rule requiring that punitive damages must be proportionate to actual
damages. An award of punitive damages in an amount proportionate to
nominal damages would obviously make no sense. This rejection of the
proportionality rule also seems appropriate for a section 1983 action
since to allow a defendant who has intentionally or recklessly deprived
another of constitutional rights to limit his liability by such an arbitrary rule serves no legitimate purpose. It seems apparent that where
intentional or reckless conduct deprives a person of constitutional
rights, the imposition of substantial damages may be warranted, regardless of the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff in monetary
terms. The need for punishment and deterrence in this situation is
compelling.
The plaintiff's receipt of a windfall in this situation does not warrant
a different conclusion.3 5 As one court stated in explaining its decision
upholding a compensatory damage award of $520 and a punitive
damage award of $25,000 against a deputy sheriff for an unlawful
arrest and beating: "Punitive damages have been held to be allowed on
the basis of punishment of the wrongdoer, not so much on the nature
and extent of the injury as on the 'oppression of the party who does
the injury.'""
The final rule to be considered is the one that allows consideration
of the defendant's wealth in assessing punitive damages. This rule is
designed to assure that the monetary award is sufficient to punish and
deter the defendant but not so high as to totally deplete his resources.
These concerns are as much a part of section 1983 remedies as they
are of tort-law remedies and thus should be applied in formulating sec305. Vetters v. Berry, 575 F.2d 90, 96 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting Johnson v. Husky Indus.,
Inc., 536 F.2d 645, 650 (6th Cir. 1976)).
306. See Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1978); DOBBS, supra note 279, at
218-19.
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tion 1983 punitive damage awards against individual defendants.
Where, however, the defendant is a local governmental body, evidence
of wealth (or lack thereof) should probably be excluded on the ground
that its potentially prejudicial effect far outweighs its probative value.
The fact finder who is presented with a section 1983 punitive damage
claim against a local governmental body will be in the peculiar position
of deciding how much money he is willing to take from his community
in order to punish the governing body for maliciously implementing a
custom or policy violative of an individual's constitutional rights. To
present a fact finder in such a case with evidence and arguments
regarding the financial condition of the local governmental body and
then expect him fairly and impartially to judge the punitive damage
claim may be asking a bit too much.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The discussion thus far has taken a critical view of the Supreme
Court's responses to the burgeoning federal caseload in the context of
civil rights claims under section 1983. By denying recognition of
federal relief for the violation of rights involving liberty interests
under the fourteenth amendment due process clause in the absence of
any claim based upon a specific constitutional guarantee, as in Paul
Ingraham, and McCollan; by developing a tiered good faith defense
available to all kinds of public officials; by limiting the recovery of
damages to those actually proved, at least in the case of procedural
due process claims; and by declining directly to confront the issue of
whether negligence can be grounds for a section 1983 claim, the Court
has acted upon its concerns that the civil rights statute not become a
font of tort law and that constitutional torts not be trivialized.
We believe the direction suggested in Paul and other cases limiting
recognition of significant interests assertible as liberty where, by
analogy, common-law tort elements can apply and state court remedies
are available, is the most dangerous approach for controlling the
breadth of section 1983. That alternative is particularly ill-suited to the
development of constitutional law since it precludes the use of a
federal forum by other plaintiffs with potentially constitutionally significant claims for redress to which common-law tort principles do not adequately respond. In relying on the theoretical availability of commonlaw or state statutory remedies as bases for precluding the recognition

307. At the same time, this concern over innocent taxpayers bearing the loss may influence the court's initial determination to impose punitive damages upon public entities
in the absence of statutory authorization. For a discussion of this problem, see Dobbs,
supra note 279, at 217-18.
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of a constitutionally based right, the Court ignores the federal policy
behind relief under section 1983; since the statute refers to vindication
of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities, common-law tort
concepts should not necessarily be determinative of civil rights liability. The approach taken in Ingraham- recognizing the liberty interest at stake, but precluding constitutionally imposed procedural safeguards for relief where, on balance, state procedures and remedies
afford the plaintiff some protection-on the other hand reduces the
presence of a constitutional interest to mere academic significance.
We believe that the answer lies in shifting the focus away from
identifying analogous common-law tort actions and state remedies for
wrongs committed by state officials to considering whether there exists a constitutional right that has been violated for which damages or
other remedies under section 1983 can be imposed. Under our proposed analysis, determining the existence of a constitutional right differs in respect to the kind of fourteenth amendment right allegedly
violated. Where a claimed liberty interest of the plaintiff which has
been invaded involves a specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights incorporated in the due process clause, the existence of a constitutional
right may be determined by reference to the guarantee. The question
whether the state official has violated a right of the plaintiff should be
considered in accordance with the standards governing the official's
conduct as set forth in the specific provision of the Bill of Rights.
Then, once a violation is shown by plaintiff, damages should be
available unless defendants meet their burden of showing they are entitled to a good faith defense. Moreover, even where defendants meet
the burden of proving good faith, the circumstances may warrant injunctive or declaratory judgment relief.
Where, however, the invasion of a liberty interest is asserted under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment without the support of a specific constitutional guarantee, to protect against the possibility that "garden variety" torts not be automatically covered by section 1983 merely because a state official has committed the wrong, a
stricter standard can be imposed without eviscerating significant
claims. Here the existence of a right should first depend upon whether
the conduct impinges on an interest fundamental to the basic concept
of ordered liberty. To determine whether a constitutional violation has
occurred, a standard of outrageousness is an appropriate limiting factor. The violation would be shown and remedy potentially recoverable
only where the conduct by the officials in the absence of further procedural protection would be considered so shocking to the conscience
that it offends a sense of justice.
While the Supreme Court has purported to be determining whether
a constitutional right exists in the cases reviewed above, the rationale
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it sets forth for the conclusions reached indicate that the Court has
resolved the issue on the basis of whether state remedies were theoretically available to redress the plaintiffs grievance. This approach
conflicts with one of the major purposes of section 1983, recognized by
the Court in Monroe, and, perhaps more damaging in the long run,
allows the future development of constitutional law to be determined
by the Court's concern for controlling the flood of section 1983 cases.
Rather than deciding claims of violations of constitutional rights in this
manner, we suggest that the Court's focus should be on the language,
history and purposes of the constitutional provisions invoked.
Once a constitutional duty and breach has been proven under this
analysis, and, depending on the nature of the claim, once it can be
determined that immunity from damages cannot be asserted, we believe the limitation on damages awards based upon the compensation
principle articulated in Carey provides a sensible means of controlling
the availability of section 1983 relief.
*

On May 27, 1980, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that in a § 1983 action brought

against a public official entitled to a qualified immunity, the plaintiff need not allege that
the defendant acted in bad faith, and the burden is on the defendant to plead good faith as
an affirmative defense. Gomez v. Toledo, 48 U.S.L.W. 4600 (1980). Significantly, Justice
Rehnquist, in a concurring statement, noted that he did not read the Court's opinion as
deciding the question of which party has the burden of persuasion with respect to the
qualified immunity defense. Id. at 4602. It remains to be seen whether the Court in future
decisions will place the burdens of pleading and persuasion on different parties for the
purposes of the defense of qualified immunity. See note 175 supra.

